When Interests Go Against Ideas

I recently read the novel Half of a Yellow Sun by Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie - a fictional story of two sisters and their simultaneous experiences in Biafra during the Nigerian Civil War.  When we in the West think of the tumultuous political times of the 1960's, the two and a half year civil war in this African state is rarely remembered.  Yet the death toll is estimated to be as high as 3 million people due to the conflict, many displaced Igbos who faced starvation and disease.  With this level of targeted starvation and genocide, how is it that this war was and continues to be so overlooked in the West?

I began to consider this conflict as I listened to the recorded lecture and found myself comparing ideas and interests.  To paraphrase the lecture, "An interest arises at the intersection of preferences and the notion of the external environment and its limitations and constraints."  This is very different than an idea (again, paraphrased), "An idea is part of the broader cultural environment and consciousness, but can work in the individual." [1]

As I began to consider this conflict in these terms, I realized that I was asking these questions because the ideas and the interests were completely at odds.  I would like to think that as a global community, we now condemn things like genocide and systematic starvation.  I would like to think that these are the types of horrors that we consider as justifiable provocation for war or military intervention.  But yet, in this instance, and so many others, the interests won out.

Nigeria had only gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1960, seven years before the conflict would occur.  As a state with 60 million people belonging to over 300 different culturally and ethnically identified groups, this state border was constructed by the West and many of the people within the state had nothing in common with one another, culturally, politically, economically, or otherwise.  Yet, the continued unity of this state was important for the UK as the Southern region - what would briefly become Biafra - controlled the ports and, therefore, controlled the trade.  However, the Hausa-Falani in the North had the majority of the population, giving them the greatest control of the Federal Legislature that was established by the colonial powers at its independence.  The British used their influence with the Emirs in the North to further pursue their own trade benefits in Nigeria.

As a result, this formed a uniform position in the rest of the Western world for the support of "a unified Nigeria."  Which is to say that they opposed the formation of Biafra.  Furthermore, this position meant that West would not oppose Nigeria as it sought to reclaim the seceded southern region.

This is where the notion of ideas and interests went in two different directions.  In a telegram from the US State Department to the Nigerian government on January 11, 1969, it states, "This basic policy of USG in respect of Nigerian crisis has since out break of civil war been paralleled by another policy, deeply rooted in American tradition, of providing assistance to civilian victims of warfare, a commonly accepted obligation of all nations. USG has accordingly since early 1968 provided assistance in various forms to Nigerian National Rehabilitation Commission, Nigerian Red Cross, ICRC and private voluntary relief agencies for relief of civilian victims of Nigerian civil war wherever located."[2]  This document shows the conflict that was happening within the State Department.  The idea of providing assistance to those in need and relieving civilians facing starvation and disease because of displacement and famine resulting directly from war is something in which Americans strongly, even if only vocally, believe.  As stated in this telegram, though, the US government mainly funneled its aid through private organizations, rather than sending it directly.  And it certainly was not going to provide military support to ensure that the food and supplies reached its target and were distributed effectively.  Still, this idea was vocalized on behalf of the US in this government telegram and continued in the minds of individual Americans.

                            Biafran children in a refugee camp in Southern Nigeria

The Nigerian government was using starvation and rampant disease, caused by overcrowding within Biafra as the Nigerian military pushed South, as a means of breaking the resolve of the Biafran people.  Providing assistance would be working against those tactics and the Nigerian government voiced its opposition to the United States delivering relief by trying to block the delivery of food and medical supplies that it claimed might contain military supplies for the rebels.

While the US's idea of providing relief and support to affected civilians remained, the interest of retaining the established economically beneficial relationship with Nigeria prevailed.  One day the war would be over, and it seemed more likely as time went on that Nigeria would reclaim the Biafran territories.  Furthermore, the UK was and remains one of the strongest allies of the United States and even sits with them as permanent members of the Security Council.  The interests of the UK needed to align with those of the United States, or at least not stand in opposition.

These telegrams and the continued efforts toward delivering aid were the total of US strategy in Nigeria.  The State Department continued to insist on delivering food, supplies, and medical support through third parties to the refugees on both sides of the conflict while communicating through direct correspondence and public statements their continued support of a whole Nigerian state.  Because the Nigerian government itself was causing the famine, the United States could not address the source, but rather only send relief to what would be a continued and constant attack on the civilians in the South.  These were the "constraints" that were discussed in the recorded lecture.  Yes, the ideas remained and were even vocalized to a certain extent, but the limitations of what could be done while maintaining diplomatic relationships with the Nigerian and British governments would not be ignored.

1. Lecture, Week 3, Interests or Ideas?
2. United States of America, Department of State, Office of the Historian, Outgoing Telegram 5133, January 11, 1969