The Power of Precedence in Nuclear Non-Proliferation

 

 

In order to fully understand the powerful role of precedence in the international control of violence, one should consider the impact that precedents have had on the use of nuclear weapons on a global scale. The topic doesn't require extensive research. Only two nuclear weapons have ever been used - The nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This incident in 1945 served as an experiment to test the potency of nuclear arms. Needless to say, the results were better than expected. Roughly 170,000 immediate Japanese casualties, and the death toll rose to 200,000+ following the event due to lingering conditions. Hiroshima and Nagasaki set an international precedent that year. The bombings marked a critical turning point for the human species. As Einstein warned and the first atomic bombings demonstrated, a single primitive nuclear weapon could destroy an entire metropolitan region and devastate its people. Senior Manhattan Project scientist Arthur H. Compton observed that the atomic weapon “introduces the question of mass slaughter, really for the first time in history.” Now we, as an international community, suddenly had all of this power. So what did we do? We all tried to buy one!

 

There are now approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the nine nuclear-weapon states, many of them 20 to 30 times more powerful than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs. Recent widely accepted scientific studies demonstrate that an exchange of just 50-100 nuclear weapons would result in nuclear famine, killing more than a billion and a half people in the Northern hemisphere. An exchange of hundreds of nuclear weapons could result in nuclear winter and the extinction of the human and many other species.

 

So why hasn't anyone else used nuclear warfare?

 

Precedent - Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated to the world that nuclear warfare is too costly. The images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki after nuclear intervention are so deeply embedded in our minds, that it is too difficult to justify nuclear action. There have been numerous historical examples since 1945 that were prime opportunities for the use of nuclear force. I believe that refraining from using nukes has become an internationally accepted norm.

 

So why do states even possess them?

 

Simple - precedent again. Although states are apprehensive about using nuclear weapons. Everyone seems to agree, for the most part, that nuclear weapons do still symbolize a state's strength. In other words, even though states might not have any intention on using their nuclear arms, they are still very interested in maintaining their nuclear program as a deterrent to pre-emptive attacks on their sovereignty.

 

The age of nuclear existence is still very young, and surely only time will tell us if there is validity in my optimism. But for everyone's sake  -  I sure hope I am right!

Nuclear Weapons and the State System

Hugh Gusterson's article on the way the West conceptualizes the distribution of nuclear weapons, and by extension third-world countries, highlights the potential of divisive topics to further entrench states behind the boundaries of sovereignty and autonomy. This point has implications for the potential of the state system to undergo fundamental change: namely, if states' way of constructing ideological (and logical) arguments is informed exclusively by sovereignty and autonomy, then they will be less likely to change in situations where conflict arises.

Gusterson points out that, "It is often said that it is inappropriate for Third World countries to squander money on nuclear (or conventional) weapons" rather than focusing on problems like poverty and homelessness [1]. Criticisms such as this one not only run the risk of hypocrisy, as Gusterson mentions, but also emphasize the every-state-for-itself mentality that characterizes a competitive weapons environment. Wealthy, "developed" countries have earned the right to spend large sums of money on weapons programs, but it is unethical for less developed countries to do so. This conceptualization shows that it is the job of each state to fend for itself, without aid from other states. Though in practice that is not always the case, and certain states sometimes intentionally contribute to the welfare of other states through humanitarian and military aid, such action is far from being seen as an obligation. 

When states, especially "advanced" ones, wish to lay claim to a specific kind of action, they often fall back upon this logic—which is essentially a more nuanced version of "might makes right." It's the same kind of thinking that empires use to rationalize colonialism, and that the Security Council uses to justify the disproportionate diplomatic power of its permanent members. 

As Laffy and Weldes point out, terminology can be a way of creating convenient dichotomies where none need exist. Classifying countries as 'developed' and 'developing' is the first step to creating different standards for those states' behavior, as the case of nuclear weapons shows. To put it a different way, we can see classification as a way for powerful states to transform interests into ideas: the interest is in preventing more states from acquiring nuclear weapons, and it changes into an idea when non-nuclear states get classified as insufficiently 'developed' to merit—or be trusted with—nuclear weapons.

[1] Gusterson, Hugh. 1999. "Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination." Cultural Anthropology 14:1. 116.

Who Has the Right to Violence in Argentina?

The state's monopoly on violence may not be as absolute as it may sometimes seem. Yes, the state seems to be the only one with the authority to commit acts of approved violence.  But, as Dr. Jackson discussed, that authority may be transferred to the state from another source.  In most modern states, we would like to believe that the source is the will of the people.

This past week I was invited to attend an exhibit of encaustic pieces at the Embassy of Argentina.  The date and time were rearranged several times to avoid protests that have been taking place outside of the Embassy.  It was interesting to see such a great event and exhibit while being on Argentinian soil, knowing that the state is currently facing so much turmoil and upheaval.  The citizens of Argentina are in turmoil about violence possibly used by the state and the government is shuffling its personnel around trying to subdue the unrest.

I was thinking about the level of distrust that is occurring in Argentina now and the reason for it as I listened to Dr. Jackson and read out materials this week.  And I have come to the conclusion that while the state may consider itself the sole owner of the authority and right to commit justified violence, the citizens consider themselves the source of such authority.  There is a national feeling of betrayal when that transferred authority is abused.  And now the people of Argentina, like everywhere, feel that they are in a position to reclaim  their authority.  Obviously President Fernandez does not agree.  

So who controls the violence now?  This is something the people of Argentina will have to sort out, but one thing is certain: the state does not clear, exclusive rights.  

Legitimacy, Popular Support, and Violence

One of the key issues in international relations as we look at non-state actors is the idea of legitimacy. Max Weber defines a state as “a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”[1] Specifically, what gives a state legitimacy and does the state has a monopoly on the legitimate exercise of violence?

Many political theorists have commented on the state's source of legitimacy. John Locke argues that “government is not legitimate unless it is carried on with the consent of the governed.”[2] Sociologist Seymour Lipset concurs, explaining that legitimacy describes “the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society.”[3]

The implications of this viewpoint are significant- if the state loses the consent of its people, or a significant portion of them, can non-state actors with popular support claim legal legitimacy? Numerous non-state actors have attempted to use this idea of popular mandate to legitimize violence.  

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (or FARC) are a leftist guerilla violent non-state actor in Colombia who oppose the Colombian government and many of the economic and political effects of globalization.[4] Ana Maria Montoya evaluated public opinion surveys in Colombia which indicated that just under 50% of Colombians would accept an elected candidate from the FARC movement, demonstrating some level of social acceptance and legitimacy.[5] This local and regional support for the FARC has permitted them to maintain the claim to legitimate action against the Colombian government, receiving official recognition as a belligerent force from Hugo Chavez.[6]

This example, along with countless others from revolutions, civil wars, and violent movements across the globe illustrate the pitfalls posed by using popular support as the primary source for legitimacy. How might we propose a better source of legitimacy for the monopolization of violence?

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[1] Mitropolitski, Simeon. "Weber’s Definition of the State as an Ethnographic Tool for Understanding the Contemporary Political Science State of the Discipline." Canadian Political Science Association, May 2011,. P. 1

[2] Dunn, John. "I. Consent in the Political Theory of John Locke." The Historical Journal 10:2 (1967), p. 153

[3] Fauvelle‐Aymar, Christine. "The political and tax capacity of government in developing countries." Kyklos 52, no. 3 (1999): 392

[4] “FARC”, Wikipedia.com (Accessed 24 February 2015, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FARC)

[5] Ana María Montoya, “Colombians’ Views of the FARC as a Political Party,” AmericasBarometer Insights: 2014: 107, p. 2

[6] Chris Kraul, “Chavez keeps up campaign to get rebels off terrorist list,” Los Angeles Times, 20 January 2008 (Accessed online, 24 February 2015 http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jan/20/world/fg-farc20) 

Sovereign States: One of Many Possible Arrangements

One of the questions that most caught my attention during our lively class debate on Monday evening was asked by a member of the Con team [I paraphrase]: How could the international system fundamentally change? What would that even look like?

The Pro team did not have a good answer to the question of what a fundamentally different international system would look like. But simply because something is difficult to imagine does not mean it cannot exist. Much of modern industry relies upon the ability to come up with things previously unimagined by most people.

Nonetheless, it is difficult to argue in favor of something with no idea as to its possible shape. So I set to thinking about what a fundamentally altered international system might look like. Professor Shirk’s comments at the end of class were helpful in that endeavor. He pointed out that throughout history, sovereign states have not always been the way in which the international system was arranged. Certain empires, for example, did not conform to that model.

We can use empires as a jumping-off point for what are, at heart, different ways of framing power. Currently, the system of sovereign states divides power into discrete units, all defined in the same way – as “states” – despite the fact that they differ in the extent and configuration of their power. Due to the imbalance of power, weaker states are incentivized to form alliances with stronger states, thereby marginally increasing the power of those already strong states.

What if we conceived of the dispersion power in a different way? For example, it is possible to imagine an arrangement in which weaker states, knowing that they could not maintain their sovereignty in any case, chose to give up their sovereignty and merge with stronger states for the protection of their citizens. In another scenario, a more even distribution of power might disincentivize both alliances and competition, making cooperation among all states more advantageous than discord. For that matter, why could power politics not play out on the world stage in the way it currently does within states, with a global government replacing state governments?

Of course, there are many reasons “why not” given the current tensions and relations among states. However, the point of the above exercise is not to measure the likelihood of those changes happening, but merely to point out that it is possible to imagine them.

The Great Debate

Clearly I am referring to the wonderful debate that we had during class on Monday.  I thought it was very interesting and I thought both teams did a wonderful job.

I think that the biggest question of the night, that Ryan perfectly captured, became establishing the fundamental aspects of the international system.  This question has become something that I have continued to consider about over the past few days.  I think, as I understood it, the Pro Group was saying that the norms and the accepted actions of states are fundamental to the international system, and those can and do change.  They pointed out one perfect example after another.

I was particularly interested in the behavior of states over that past few hundred years that they pointed out.  Slavery was a very profound facet of this change.  At one time is was perfectly acceptable, normal, and advantageous for states to authorize and facilitate the capture and sale of whole groups of people.  If this is how the international community functioned just a short time ago, then we cannot disagree that there has been a substantial shift in norms.

Another fascinating point brought up by the Pro Group was the establishment and continued expansion of the EU.  The EU is obviously a very unique occurrence in the international sphere.  To have states giving up such large portions of their sovereignty is clearly indicative of a major development in international cooperation.

I also felt that our group made some persuasive points in response to these examples.  Yes, slavery has ended as a state-endorsed trade.  But is that perhaps more a shift in societal norms?  There have been different types of human rights violations that humankind has carried out over the course of history, but does the end or decrease of these actions indicate that the system itself has changed?  And if not, then what would prompt us to think that it ever will?

As was discussed within the Con Group, the EU, while exceptional, can be viewed as a way for states to consolidate power and advance their status internationally.  Turkey has long wanted to be viewed as a modern state by the West, and joining the EU is a way for this state to establish its relevance to the global community.  However, as our group mentioned, the larger states who are not as reliant on the collective strength of the EU have been looking to maintain their high level of influence within the union as it has been diluted with the large number of additions.  This is what has led to a debate over qualified majority voting.  So perhaps the entire system has not fundamentally shifted  Instead, states are still carrying out the same rational behavior, just through more modern methods.

Again, I would point out that this depends on your definition of the fundamentals.  If you were to start with the idea that the accepted norms and general behavior between states are the basic elements of international relations, then yes, change is not only possible, but it is occurring all the time.  If, however, you were to begin with sovereign individual states as the primary actors operating in anarchy, then change has not occurred.  My group sought to demonstrate that because this system has endured through all of the normative changes, and there have been many that were extremely substantial, it would indicate that changing values and accepted behaviors will not affect the fundamental system.

I personally thought the debate was our best and most interesting class yet.  It brought up some very fascinating points and complex questions about what we consider to be the basic mechanics of the international world.  I look forward to circling back to this debate as the class continues and we react to further readings.

Change for More of the Same

Wow, so I just realized that this post never published.  Like the one before it, I was on a plane when I wrote this and it looks like the in-flight internet failed me and instead just saved it to my drafts when I logged out.  This was written before the debate which is why I don't mention our live session at all, so just know that when reading.

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I just finished the article from Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal for next week's readings and I was very interested at the idea that international institutions can actually further entrench the established international system rather than provide any path for alteration.

It got me thinking about WWII and the formation of the UN.  Last semester, I read David Bosco's book Five to Rule Them All about the UN Security Council's permanent members and how that structure came to be.  As I read the Koremenos article, I was struck by how much of that book related to what the article had to say.  The winners of WWII used the Security Council as a way to solidify their current, hard-won status on the international stage.

The three main Allied Powers were obviously all going to get a seat on the council.  There was a strong British push for another Western voice, and France was the obvious choice, particularly during that time period.  Lastly China was added, which is still considered unusual to some extent, but it was a second addition that the US and the USSR could agree on.  And that's how the five came to be.

Even in just that short, and very reductive paragraph, one can see the power politics.  Each of the states was considered about their power relative to the rest of the world, and even to each other.  The idea of a global forum where each voice and each state was equal was not appealing to the victors.  It was so unappealing that the US chose to not even participate a few years earlier when the world formed the League of Nations.  There had to be a select group for the winners, where they could hold just a bit more power than the rest.

And we can see how they chose to manage their power struggles against one another.  Obviously, British leadership knew that after reclaiming France, along with the American forces, a French ally on the Council would be a strong one for a long time.  These two states wanted France to make the Western voice for capitalism and democracy to be concrete within the Council and selected a member whom they could expect to vote from that viewpoint.  Of course the Soviet Union saw this as a threat to their own brand of government and economic structure and needed an alternative member, but more than that, they needed the veto.  This was a highly contested issue, but eventually the USSR got it, and they wasted little time using it.

As Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal stated, "States spend significant amounts of time and effort constructing institutions precisely because they can advance or impede state goals in the international economy, the environment, and national security. States fight over institutional design because it affects outcomes. Moreover, the institutions they create cannot be changed swiftly or easily to conform to changing configurations of international power. Japan and Germany play modest roles in the UN today because they have been unable to reverse the decision made in 1944-45 to exclude them from the Security Council." [1]  I think that is a perfect description of what I read in Bosco's book and I think it's a very interesting take on the whether or not institution offer change or impede it.

1. Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. "The Rational Design of International Institutions." International Organization: 762.

Can the System Change?

What does it mean to change the international system?

One of the fundamental questions of the debate was largely semantic: how do we define what “change” is in the international system? In order to clearly define what change looks like, it is helpful to define the historical organization of the international system. IF we accept the neorealist viewpoint, the international system is anarchy, and “anarchies are necessarily “self-help” systems in which both central authority and collective security are absent.”[1] Changing the international system in this context would constitute changing how states pursue their interests- from “anarchy and self-help” to collectivism and cooperation. Alexander Wendt explains this view on change, contending that “transformations of identity and interests through process are transformations of structure.”[2] Transforming the structure of the international system to one based on collectivism and cooperation is fundamentally remaking the international system.

What evidence of change is there?

International organizations are strongest example of states transitioning from self-help to cooperation.  The strength of international organizations has been in overcoming the prisoner’s dilemma by linking state interests to positive outcomes through cooperation. There are numerous examples of how this manifests itself in international policy, several of which are discussed briefly below.

World Trade Organization

The WTO has rallied states around the principle of fairness in the application of trade rules between states. The WTO has an 80% success rate in resolving disputes, often at the expense of one party’s sovereign right to determine its own trade policy.

European Union

The European Union has progressed from an economic organization to a regional governance organization with shared currency and a body of regulations on economics, trade, and politics. States continue to cede the European Union more sovereignty because they recognize the benefits derived from cooperation within the region.

United Nations Security Council

In contrast with wars 200 years ago, states are now required to justify their wars of aggression to the UN Security Council, and seek an international mandate. States which do not receive a mandate and who act without a broad base of international support are often subject to coercive measures from the international community, including sanctions or armed intervention. This reflects the changing international norm that invasions and wars of aggression are not acceptable.

These examples reiterate the idea that norms of state behavior are changing. International organizations create the incentives for cooperation which reduce instances of states acting to secure their perceived interests through “self-help.”

A "Fair" Assessment of the Debate

I entered the class debate over whether “the international system can be fundamentally remade” with a realist perspective rooted in my pessimism toward human nature and the belief that war is an inevitable part of international relations. As I evaluated the arguments for and against the ability of the international system to change, I identified convincing indicators that the international system is currently undergoing change, shifting from self-help and individualism toward collectivism and cooperation. I was not convinced by the negative (or con teams) contentions that international organizations were just vehicles for states to exert their sovereign interests- because there were numerous examples of states ceding sovereignty or accepting a loss at the WTO because the benefits of cooperation outweighed the disadvantages. Ultimately I think the pro side has a stronger argument. The argument that fundamental change has not occurred yet does not preclude the idea that change can, or is occurring.

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[1] Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics." International organization 46, no. 02 (1992): 394

[2] Ibid, 394

What are we even here for?

I remain unconvinced by the CON team's argument or evidence. Fundamental change, in the way that I understand it, always begins with an idea. In the case of slavery, for example, someone had to first come to the conclusion that slavery was a violation of fundamental human rights - this was the precursor for the abolitionist movement that would eventually lead to the demise of the United States slave trade. In the same fashion, when I consider the capacity for change in the international system, I believe that changing ideas eventually lead to changes in actions.

During this debate, the point was brought up several times by the CON team that change by a minority of the international system will not lead to change among the rest of the international system. I am struggling a lot with this statement. It is hard for me to contend that change starts as a universally accepted rule. In my opinion, this statement defies one particular facts about the nature of international relations as it currently stands:

• The power of norms - Yes, there will always be outliers (i.e. North Korea, ISIS) that will behave outside of the internationally acceptable norms. However, that cannot discredit the power of norms in the international community. States frequently adhere to these unbinding "laws" even though there is nothing forcing them to do so. I would even argue that it is generally in the interest of states to adhere to these internationally accepted norms and ideas about how the world should or shouldn't behave. Again - that is not to say that there cannot be outliers whose "state interest" doesn't align with the norms, but rather my argument is in the fact that historically (insert nuclear weapon example, insert slavery example, insert international human rights laws), the majority of states have tended to cooperate and accept international norms.

Devil's advocate - If we were to agree with the CON team's argument that change must be universal, otherwise it is ineffective - then I cannot fathom a reason why we would all be in this program, let alone in this field of work. So I was left with one lingering question after pondering the CON team's position - - - If we don't plan on making it better - what are we doing here?

Neorealism in Modern-Day Russia-US Relations

In his 1988 paper on "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," Kenneth Waltz states that "Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has to seek the approval of other states, but each has to cope with the other." [1] He was referring to the nature of alliances, in which the strongest states have little to gain from alliances compared to weaker states. During the Cold War, the two superpowers had by far the most bargaining power and autonomy within their respective webs of alliances, while other states would seek to ally themselves with either the US or the USSR.

Waltz then asserts, "In a two-power competition, a loss for one is easily taken to be a gain for the other." [2] This was never more true than at the end of the Cold War, when the Soviet economy when into decline and the USSR ultimately dissolved. No new power emerged in the vacuum left by the Soviet Union, so the US stood (and continues to stand, in many ways) as the sole global superpower. At that point, it was not necessary for the US to continue expanding its power; it was necessary only for Soviet power to decline in order for the US role on the world stage to radically alter.

But strangely, despite no longer commanding the Soviet Union or power comparable to that of the US, in some ways modern-day Russia seems to be playing the game of international politics as though it still possessed the power and autonomy it did during the Cold War (relative to other states). Taking a closer look at the way in which Russia has formed alliances since the end of the Cold War can provide insight into the way Russia perceives itself on the international stage and whether Russia perceives itself as neorealism would dictate or not. Does the power-balance theory of neorealism, as articulated by Waltz, hold true for Russia today?

During the Cold War, the USSR signed the Warsaw Pact and allied itself to Albania, Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Republic, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. [3] At that time, the USSR was the leviathan of the alliance, possessing significantly greater military might than the other member states.

After the Soviet Union dissolved and Russia emerged as the successor state, the Warsaw Pact was replaced by the Collective Security Treaty Organization, signed in 1992 and including Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan. The members of CSTO were all post-Soviet states. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan have all withdrawn from CSTO since its formation in 1992. [4]

So the alliance that the USSR had formed with a number of other states under the Warsaw pact was no renewed - and was not adequately replaced, since CSTO did not include any non-former-Soviet states, and in fact only comprised a fraction of former Soviet states. Russia's alliance system contracted significantly after 1991.

In contrast, the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance formed during the Cold War weathered the collapse of the Soviet Union and even expanded in subsequent years. 12 members originally joined NATO in 1949, most notably the United States, and there are currently 28 member states. [5] NATO did need to significantly re-evaluate its mission following the collapse of its raison d'être, the Soviet Union, and there was doubt at the time as to whether the alliance would continue. Ultimately, several members of the former USSR joined NATO, and it is arguably the strongest alliance of states in existence today.

The United States has continued to cultivate alliances with strong states like France and the United Kingdom, while Russia appears increasingly isolated. Nonetheless, Russia continues to behave with a high degree of autonomy, seeming to disregard the opinion of the international community or its diminished strength therein. Recent examples of this include Russia encouraging encouraging separatists in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine now. Russia has not changed its policy towards Ukraine despite sanctions by the US and some of its allies. [6]

Back to neorealism: Waltz implies in his article that being in a position of relative power means that strong states only have to "cope with" other powers, not seek their approval. Given Russia's loss of power since the end of the Cold War, one might expect it to have become less bold in its foreign policy, and have begun courting the approval of other states. The latter, at least, has not happened: Russia's alliances have diminished, not increased, since 1992, and although it has developed a working relationship with China, the two countries have not formed a formal alliance to merge their power. The question remains, is Russia ignoring the realities of global power balances?

I would argue that Russia is not ignoring the global power balance, but rather testing the boundaries of when other states are willing to exercise their power. Thus far, the world's reaction to Russia's actions in Georgia, Ukraine and even Syria has been fairly tepid - not enough to deter the state from pursuing its perceived interests. By testing the limits of what other powers, particularly the US, will allow it to get away with, Russia may be carving out more power for itself simply by means of audacity - playing off of the reluctance of other powers to get involved in a real fight.


[1] Waltz, Kenneth. "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory." The Journal of Interdisciplinary History:1988. Page 9.
[2] Ibid.
[3] "The Warsaw Pact is Formed." 2015. The History Channel Website. Feb. 1, 2015. <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/the-warsaw-pact-is-formed>
[4] "Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)." 2015. Global Security Website. Feb. 1, 2015. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/csto.htm>
[5] "NATO Member Countries." 2015. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Website. Feb. 1, 2015. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm>
[6] Tisdall, Simon. "US increasingly concerned that Russia is intent on partitioning Ukraine." 2 Feb. 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/02/us-russia-ukraine-rebels-weapons-kiev-putin>

Changing World Order: Accomodating China's Rise

The rise of China will likely be the most important international relations story of the twenty-first century, but it remains unclear whether that story will have a happy ending. Will China's ascent increase the probability of great-power war? Will an era of U.S.-Chinese tension be as dangerous as the Cold War? Will it be even worse, because China, unlike the Soviet Union, will prove a serious economic competitor as well as a geopolitical one? Further, is the current international system conducive for a Chinese hegemon?



These issues have been addressed by a wide range of experts -- regionalists, historians, and economists -- all of whom can claim insight into certain aspects of the situation. But China's unique qualities, past behavior, and economic trajectory may well turn out to be less important in driving future events than many assume -- because how a country acts as a superpower and whether its actions and those of others will end in battle are shaped as much by general patterns of international politics as by idiosyncratic factors. Such broader questions about the conditions under which power transitions lead to conflict are precisely what international relations theorists study, so they, too, have something to add to the discussion.



So far, the China debate among international relations theorists has pitted optimistic liberals against pessimistic realists. The liberals argue that because the current international order is defined by economic and political openness, it can accommodate China's rise peacefully. The United States and other leading powers, this argument runs, can and will make clear that China is welcome to join the existing order and prosper within it, and China is likely to do so rather than launch a costly and dangerous struggle to overturn the system and establish an order more to its own liking. [1]



The standard realist view, in contrast, predicts intense competition. China's growing strength, most realists argue, will lead it to pursue its interests more assertively, which will in turn lead the United States and other countries to balance against it.[2] This cycle will generate at the least a parallel to the Cold War standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, and perhaps even a hegemonic war. Adherents of this view point to China's recent harder line on its maritime claims in the East China and South China seas and to the increasingly close relations between the United States and India as signs that the cycle of assertiveness and balancing has already begun.



Current international conditions should enable both the United States and China to protect their vital interests without posing large threats to each other.



In fact, however, a more nuanced version of realism provides grounds for optimism. China's rise need not be nearly as competitive and dangerous as the standard realist argument suggests, because the structural forces driving major powers into conflict will be relatively weak. The dangers that do exist, moreover, are not the ones predicted by sweeping theories of the international system in general but instead stem from secondary disputes particular to Northeast Asia -- and the security prevalent in the international system at large should make these disputes easier for the United States and China to manage. In the end, therefore, the outcome of China's rise will depend less on the pressures generated by the international system than on how well U.S. and Chinese leaders manage the situation. Conflict is not predetermined -- and if the United States can adjust to the new international conditions, making some uncomfortable concessions and not exaggerating the dangers, a major clash might well be avoided.

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[1]  Bijian, Zheng (September–October 2005). "China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status". Foreign Affairs 84 (5): 22. doi:10.2307/20031702. Retrieved 6 December 2012.

[2] Bingguo, Dai (6 December 2010). "Persisting with Taking the Path of Peaceful Development". Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China

Deflate-gate: Interests Versus Ideas

Since the Patriots were discovered to have partially deflated the footballs their team used during their win in the semifinals, a nationwide debate has broken out that pits interests against ideas.  The debate gains nuance when looked at through the lens of “symbolic technologies” as described by Laffy and Weldes; ideas in this case are more than just tools in argument, they are influential in shaping individuals’ perspectives in particular cases. It is interesting to speculate, nonetheless, as to the degree to which pre-existing feelings about the Patriots affect people’s stances toward the incident.

A little background: After the Patriots won their semifinal game against the Colts 7 to 45 two weeks ago, 11 of the 12 balls that the Patriots used were found to have been slightly deflated. This makes the football easier to handle in the rain (it was raining during the game). Though an investigation is ongoing, the action has not affected the Patriots’ season.

But the controversy is strong: opponents of the action have said that the Patriots cheated, and should be sanctioned in some way. Patriots supporters maintain that the team displayed creativity in their tactics, and even applaud the team’s do-what-it-takes attitude. In a Keohane and Goldstein framing, we could see the Patriots as choosing to act in accordance with their interest (winning) rather than in accordance with ideas of fair play and sportsmanship.

“Ideas,” in this instance, play a potentially controversial role. On the one hand, the idea of fair play seen from the perspective of Laffy and Weldes could genuinely play a constitutive role in the way viewers conceptualize actions like deflating footballs. On the other hand, another factor may be contributing a significant role: pre-existing feelings toward the Patriots (or any team in question). Thus individuals’ commitment to ideas might fluctuate according to whether it is a team they support or a team they detest that has carried out the questionable action. The fact that Patriots fans seem so much more disposed to defend their action while non-Patriots fans vehemently condemn it provides support for the hypothesis that interests here are playing a role in constituting ideas more than the other way around.