Global Leadership and U.S. Decline

In our discussion of threats facing the United States, a lot of focus was placed on acute threats to power. Global warming, global extremists, cyber terrorism, and government shutdowns, etc., were expressed in terms of dire physical and economic consequences. The debate in many ways devolved to Live Free and Die Hard versus the Day After Tomorrow versus Olympus Has Fallen/"24", each expressing alarmist worse case scenarios for U.S. power. Rather than siding with any of the more acute scenarios provided in class, I will offer a more rational vision of the future:

There is reason to believe that the U.S. soft power is in decline, as a result of failing to achieve military objectives, political and moral failings in foreign policy, failure to foster peace and diplomatic understanding, political infighting, the spread of global governance and international norms, globalization, etc.  Mahatma Ghandi explained that “leadership at one time meant muscles, but today it means getting along with people.”[1] Soft Power is the “ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and values.”[2] Soft power exists because the rest of the world recognizes it exists. The United States is the “leader of the free world” because other countries follow us, and our global leadership is in decline and threatened.

The U.S. frequently sides with its perceived “interests” in the “ideas versus interests” paradox, abandoning international norms (think CIA Black Sites, Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, CIA torture reports, Drone Strikes, support for Saudi Arabia, etc., etc.) U.S. leadership failures are not a new development or a product of the war on terror- Kissinger’s foreign policy was morally atrocious, and he defended himself by declaring that “A country that demands moral perfection in its foreign policy will achieve neither perfection nor security.”[3]

Globalization and the spread of democratic norms means that the importance of soft power is growing, and U.S. excesses and failures in leadership are increasingly harming U.S image. The European Union and International Organizations are increasingly offering an ideological alternative to the U.S. for like-minded western powers. Kay King, vice president of the Council of Foreign Relations states that the U.S. “inability to tackle tough problems, both domestic and international, has serious national security consequences, in part because it leads the world to question U.S. global leadership.”[4] Kristin Lord analyzes this trend for Foreign Policy, wondering “how much damage must the United States suffer before it learns to take soft power more seriously and, finally, learn to use it more proactively?”[5] How do we go from winning the Nobel Peace Prize to earning widespread condemnation on human rights from the likes of Human Rights Watch, China, and ISIS?

The greatest threat to U.S. power is our failure to lead.

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[1] Vineet Nayar, “Leadership Redefined,” Harvard Business Review, September 23, 2008 https://hbr.org/2008/09/leadership-redefined/

[2] Joseph S. Nye Jr., “The Decline of America's Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs, June 2004

[3] Wawrytko, Sandra Ann, ed. The Problem of Evil: An Intercultural Exploration. Vol. 90. Rodopi, 2000.

[4] Kenneth R. Bazinet, “CFR: Gridlock in Congress Threatens National Security,” New York Daily News, 22 February 2013

[5] Kristin Lord, “Soft Power Outage,” Foreign Policy¸ December 23, 2014 http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/23/soft-power-outage/

The Last Debate

Our last debate was extremely interesting and I think two main points were brought up that will stick with me:  First, there are many different ways in which one can measure or view power.  Second, power is a multi-faceted and fickle quality.

I really started thinking about power and just what that means.  Yes, the US has the largest military in the world and it is more capable and better trained than any force is the history of mankind.  This cannot be separated from my perception of what level of power we possess.  To pretend that might and power are not closely related with each influencing the other is completely pointless.  However, this has been the case for a long time, and I would argue that during the height of US isolationism when we refused to join the League of Nations and remained formally separate from its progress, our power was limited, regardless of the size of our military.  I would argue that our power has grown exponentially since WWII and the formation of the UN, even as our military personnel numbers have shrunk.  The reason being is that the US has institutionalized it realm of influence and has been able to enshrine its influence in both diplomatic and economic issues.  So power right now seems to be a lofty position in a negotiation, but also the weight of enforcement during any debates.

Lastly, anything can drastically influence the power structure.  During the Cold War, the United States had autonomy and immunity in many matters of international relations as it pursued the Western interests in opposition to the USSR.  Had the Bay of Pigs happened in the 2000's, the international reaction would have been overwhelming.  Of course this is, in part, due to the access that most of the world now has to instantaneous news sources.  But even accounting for that, the US does not have the power that it once did, as there is no longer and opponent or an other.  Which goes to show that winning a prolonged conflict can, in reality, decrease the power of another state.

Political Division for a Nuclear Iran

As I'm sure everyone saw, a group of Senators recently penned an open letter to Iran revealing the political division that has formed a gulf in the middle of the US foreign policy strategy.  Recently, however, the NYTimes published an opinion piece about the unanimous legislation that recently passed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, giving Congress a powerful seat at the Iran negotiations.  The Obama Administration initially threatened to veto the bill, but relented when threatened by a bi-partisan override.

In our groups and for the debate, we only spoke about political division in terms of political parties, but this article got me thinking about the growing divide between the legislative and administrative branches.  Now, it was brought up in the debate that this is perhaps the essence of democracy, and I couldn't disagree more.  Debate is inherent to democracy; division and disagreement for the sake of raising one's own profile and political clout is not.  And that is what I keep seeing more and more between these two branches.  The executive branch continues to try and expand its wartime powers, and has even far expanded the definition of war in order to accomplish that.  Gone are the days where the President would address Congress to request a declaration of war.  Additionally, roles normally reserved for the Administration are now being infringed.  In fact, both sides of aisle can come together in agreement to increase their own political standing in this debate.  It seems to me that this reshaping of the roles of the branches should be discussed more as a type of division as we seek to determine the detriment that it could present.

1. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/15/opinion/a-reckless-act-in-the-senate-on-iran.html?_r=0

The Final Debate

The final blog entry in this course is dedicated to our class debate on what was the greatest threat to U.S. power. My initial thought was that the main threat surely must represent a large umbrella that covered multiple threats, which in the right combination and timing, could indeed push the United States of America into joining the ranks of those great powers that went before into drastic decline. I would say that threats vary greatly; depending on the ideas and interests of a country and its people.

I was part of Team 4. We chose cyber terrorism as the largest threat against U.S. hegemonic power. While I don't believe that cyber terrorism (alone) is a threat to U.S. power, I do believe that a cyber-attack by a non-state actor would turn into an unprecedented security threat for the U.S. We are living in an internet-determined world order where conflict, cooperation and strategy are all inevitably tied to individual or group applications of IT. Cyber war capacities  are no longer the domain of only big guns like China and the U.S. They are spreading horizontally to middle and even minor powers; including non-state actors. In fact, today non-state actors have the ability to launch cyber-attacks against their enemy without much repercussion. Cyber terrorism is a threat to U.S. power because it is our greatest immediate vulnerability and if an enemy state or non-state actor wanted to offset the current balance of power they would most likely come up with a less predictable preemptive strategy such as attacking our online databases.

It was a delight to have different perspectives debated. One realization was the importance of being able to debate for the sake of debate, as it certainly was an acquired skill set. Each team had good arguments and let open some loopholes, which is expected considering the time constraint. An interesting observation for me was to see how each threat that the teams’ came up with had valid (and sometimes concerning) points. I think it brought full circle what we have been learning all semester - and that is simply that your perception of global affairs is strongly influenced and determined by the school of thought that you tend to fall into.

All Theory Revised: End of Semester Reflection

In "The Balance of Power in the Balance," Daniel Nexon attempts to discern whether enough counter-evidence has accumulated against traditional balance of power theory that we can abandon it, or whether it should simply be revised. This method of looking at theories as correct or incorrect, abandoning them or updating them, may not be the best way of utilizing theory to inform our worldviews. A view can be useful and worth considering even while not be correct. So long as there is some rationale behind a view that at one point seemed logical, there is space to utilize that view, even if events do not turn out precisely as a particular school of thought would predict.

We have gone through this cycle of thinking all semester; indeed, we see it recur whenever we pose binary questions: Do states act based on interests or ideas? Does coercion or rationality govern the international sphere? The balance-of-power question is only the latest one. But the truth, too often, is that while one side or the other might be "proven right" if events bear out their predictions, there are too many variables involved in real-life situations for one side to ever guarantee the predictive power of their theory.

That does not mean theories are useless. Rather, the realities of international politics mean that all theories are of limited utility, which in turn means that it is more useful to understand actors' behavior through several lenses than it is to "pick" a theory and expect it to hold true in all cases.

So perhaps the strongest lesson I have learned this semester is: It's way easier to understand things in hindsight than it is to predict them, because people and states have lots of different reasons for their behavior. It's quite enough to just try and keep up.

The Likeliness of Hegemonic Institutions

After our week 14 live session, I began to consider the four institutions presented by Professor Jackson.  Like most of the class, I found the idea of hegemonic institutions to be the most likely and persuasive.  

Like most realists, I see the growth of institutions to be an extension of the existing power structure established by the most powerful states.  Yes, there has been a large increase in cooperation, but on the terms of the most powerful.  As this system become more and more established, all of the states will continue to follow this comfortable structure.  This system provides security and economic stability for those who cooperate.  

The predictability of this system is what I believe will cause it to prevail over the other three.  With each area of global interaction, the rules have become more and more established and the accepted behavior of states has become more standardized.  Economic disputes are settled within the WTO and the adherence to its rulings is extremely, especially when considering the lack of enforcement.  The number of states who have given authority to the ICC is overwhelming, the trade cooperation of the EU is unprecedented, and the UN continues to serve as a forum for facilitating almost all major international and diplomatic activity.  With this level of cooperation and satisfaction among both the most and least powerful states, I think that the hegemonic institutions are even more likely to remain than ever before.

Alternative Outcomes in International Relations

In his asynchronous soliloquy this week, Professor Jackson introduces several "scenarios" as possible futures for the international realm, which could supercede the historic rise and fall of great powers and incessant competition for power among them. The first scenario is hegemonic institutions, backed by a great power and the threat of coercive force; the second is constitutional moments, in which states would cooperate in what they perceived to be a common goal; and the third Jackson names the "human project," in which all of humanity would unite for the common good.

As Jackson points out, the prospects for the "human project" seem dim, given the very human tendency to a) form subgroups within a population and b) only unite against a common enemy. But this analysis is outdated because the communication and social constraints that once governed human interaction are loosening as technology advances.

It is true that the modern world contains people of strongly, even violently, opposing viewpoints. It is also true that the media too often plays a divisive rather than unitary role as it serves as the medium between people in different parts of the world. But increasing access to a variety of media sources and individuals' stories means that it is harder for a single story to manipulate large numbers of people.

It may not happen this generation, nor even the one after. But rapidly increasing access to information worldwide means that we will eventually have a better idea of whether humans, unfettered by biased media or self-interested governments, desire or are capable of the "human project." Perhaps they (we) will reject it; perhaps not. Only time will tell. It is premature, however, to assume that only an extraterrestrial enemy is capable of uniting the human race.

When International Norms Don't Become Domestic Practice

In their chapter on "The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practice," Risse and Sikkink discuss the role that transnational advocacy networks play in process of norm diffusion in the international sphere. They point out that such networks are able to create a dual pressure, coming "from above" (moral consciousness raising among other states) and "from below" (the legitimization of the claims of domestic opposition group), to induce states to adopt domestic human rights policies that they might otherwise not. [1]

States react to the pressure to change in different ways. There is a spectrum of conforming behavior, from tactical concessions to actual rule-consistent behavior. But of course, there are also states which remain in the initial response phases described by Risse and Sikkink, "repression of network" and "denial." [2] Of course, every state under pressure has its price, it just depends on whether the international community is ready and willing to pay it.

The strength of the pressure applied to non-conforming states varies with the will of other key state actors. This brings us back to the interests versus ideas dichotomy. How much are states willing to sacrifice their interests in the name of ideas?

As an extreme example, let's briefly examine North Korea in this context. This is a state whose government has been exposed to constant moral "shaming," whose economy is shockingly unproductive compared to its southern neighbor, and whose relations with other countries have been stilted at best for decades. In 2013, North Korea's GNI was only $1,200 per capita, while South Korea's GNI was $26,200 per capita. [3] NK has ratified several key human rights treaties, but according to Human Rights Watch, continues with its policy of "systematic denial of basic freedoms in the country." [4]

Awareness has been raised in the international community, which is the pressure "from above" that Risse and Sikkink speak of. What appears to be missing from this equation is the element of pressure "from below," which would involve domestic opposition groups. The repression of free speech in NK is so extreme that there appear to be few, if any, domestic opposition groups to be legitimated. The pressure "from above" would have to be greatly increased to compensate, but that has yet to happen. My best guess is that for other states, it is more in their interest to condemn from a distance than to take action that might have real consequences.

[1] Risse, Thomas and Kathryn Sikkink. "The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms Into Domestic Practice." The Power of Human Rights. p.5.
[2] Ibid, p.22.
[3] "North Korea's Economy: Spring Release."  The Economist. Published 28 Feb. 2015; accessed 6 April 2015. http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21645252-tantalising-signs-change-are-emerging-whether-they-signal-more-profound-shifts-less
[4] "North Korea." Human Rights Watch, World Report 2014. http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/north-korea

The Strange Bedfellows: Chinese and American Foreign Policy in East Asia

Balance of power politics in East Asia is a topic of special interest within the context of the rise and fall of great powers like the United States and China. Marc Beeson’s article, “Hegemonic transition in East Asia? The Dynamics of Chinese and American Power”, offers an interesting perspective on Chinese foreign policy, stating that “it is clear that China is not yet – and possibly may never be – in a position to replace the US as the dominant power in the region.”[1] Several paragraphs later, Beeson concludes that “despite the apparent durability of American leadership, its relationship with East Asia generally and China in particular, suggest that this dominance is declining and may be less substantial than it appears.”[2]

Traditional power politics would suggest a tug-of-war relationship between the U.S. and China, with each state seeking to exert its influence in mutually strategic zones. A cursory analysis of chest-pounding in the South China Sea seems to reflect this idea. Yan Xuetong, President of the Carnegie Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, argues that “China and the United States are vying with each other not only in Southeast Asia but also in many other parts of the world. The global framework is shifting from being unipolar to being bipolar, not multipolar. That change derives from an objective shift in power.”[3] These power dynamics have led some to refer to the competition between the United States and China as “the cool war.”

This leads us to a more important question, specifically: what theoretical framework should be used to characterize great power relations within the context of international institutions, global governance structures, non-governmental organizations, and the evolving “global public sphere”?

One such framework is offered by international relations scholar Joseph S. Nye Jr., in his article “The Future of American Power.” Nye argues that:

“Power today is distributed in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional chess game. On the top chessboard, military power is largely unipolar, and the United States is likely to retain primacy for quite some time. On the middle chessboard, economic power has been multipolar for more than a decade, with the United States, Europe, Japan, and China as the major players and others gaining in importance. The bottom chessboard is the realm of transnational relations. It includes nonstate actors as diverse as bankers who electronically transfer funds, terrorists who traffic weapons, hackers who threaten cybersecurity, and challenges such as pandemics and climate change. On this bottom board, power is widely diffused, and it makes no sense to speak of unipolarity, multipolarity, or hegemony.”[4]

The implications of this view are significant and far reaching:

The economic and social connections between the U.S. and China on secondary and tertiary “power chessboards” prevent an armed conflict, because both countries recognize it would have drastic and far reaching negative consequences. Yan Xuetong concurs, noting that “recent talk of a “new type of great power relationship” between the United States and China is based on implementing control to avoid military conflict.”[5]

The increasingly global nature of security, economics, and politics also forces the U.S. and China to work together on key issues. Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Advisor for Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, writes that: “The United States has an abiding interest in preserving stability in the U.S.-China relationship so that it can continue to secure Beijing's cooperation on an expanding list of regional and global issues and more tightly integrate China into the prevailing international system.”[6] China holds over one trillion dollars in U.S. debt, and the U.S. is the most significant market for Chinese exports, tying their economic fates in a Gordian knot.[7]

This returns us to the topic of the rise and fall of great powers. Within the context discussed above, one might argue that we have abandoned the model of bipolar relations, and that new power relations with linked interests dominate competition in East Asia.  The “Cool War” describes this paradox between competition and cooperation. Noah Feldman writes in Foreign Policy that “a classic struggle for power between two countries is unfolding at the same time that economic cooperation between them is becoming deeper and more fundamental.”[8] The implications of this relationship are numerous and far reaching, and in many cases, still undefined.

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[1] Beeson, Mark. "Hegemonic transition in East Asia? The dynamics of Chinese and American power." Review of International Studies 35, no. 01 (2009): 95-112.

[2] Ibid., 112

[3] Yan Xuetong and Koichi Furuya, “Conflict Control” is Key to U.S.-China Relations in a Bipolar World”, The Carnegie Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, 14 May 2014 http://carnegietsinghua.org/publications/?fa=55600

[4] Joseph S. Nye, “The Future of American Power”, Foreign Affairs, December 2010

[5] Yan Xuetong and Koichi Furuya, “Conflict Control” is Key to U.S.-China Relations in a Bipolar World”, The Carnegie Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, 14 May 2014 http://carnegietsinghua.org/publications/?fa=55600

[6] Bonnie S. Glaser, “Armed Clash in the South China Sea: Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14,” The Council on Foreign Relations, April 2012 http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883

[7] Eswar Prasad, “The U.S.-China Economic Relationship: Shifts and Twists in the Balance of Power,” The Brookings Institute, February 25, 2010 http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2010/02/25-us-china-debt-prasad

[8] Noah Feldman, “The Unstoppable Force vs. the Immovable Object,” Foreign Policy, May 16, 2013

Anarachy or Sovereignty?

John Ikenberry makes three main arguments in his essay, “Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age.”  The first argument is that imperial temptations can be generated by unipolarity, “ but notions of empire do not adequately capture key features of the political order that have grown up around American power” (Ikenberry, 2004).  The second argument made is that “both liberal and imperial logics are at play in the current American unipolar moment” (Ikenberry, 2004), and it is highlighted that these liberal and imperial logics have been rooted in American diplomacy and political culture.  The third main argument that Ikenberry makes is that “despite Washington's imperial temptation, the US is not doomed to abandon rule-based order” (Ikenberry, 2004).

 

 The section of the article that I found most interesting in relation to this course’s overall theme of sovereignty within the international realm was the section titled Anarchy and Hierarchy.  It is highlighted that “neorealists make the elemental distinction between anarchy and hierarchy. Anarchy is order without central authority” (Ikenberry, 2004).  It is then noted that “In a condition of anarchy, states do not stand in any fixed, formal, or hierarchical relation with one another” (Ikenberry, 2004).  To summarize, there is no hierarchy within anarchy.

The reason that I found this statement so interesting is because within the international realm where each state holds sovereignty, there is still an understood level of hierarchy that the public sees and, for the most part, adheres to.  Even though within anarchy, there is not supposed to be levels of power - it is very easy to have common understandings of what sovereign states are more powerful and hold more weight in the international realm.  I am not saying that everyone sees this ranking the same.   I can imagine that citizens of one country may hold the importance of their country higher than citizens of other countries.  But nonetheless, there are certain norms that imply that some countries or continents are power houses in the international realm.  

Is it possible that this hierarchy of power is an example that each sovereign state may not really be as autonomous and  sovereign as some scholars of the international realm assume?    

 

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Reference: 

John Ikenberry, “Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age,” Review of International Studies 30:4 (2004).

Week 13 Lecture Questions

Professor Jackson ended this week’s lecture with several questions about the notion of a global public sphere.  It is a discussion filled with open-ended possibilities, but I will offer my own opinions on a few of the questions. 

1.  Can there actually be a global public sphere if every state does not have democratic accountability?

           

I believe the answer is yes.  A strong enough public movement in one country that is reinforced by the public in other states can be enough to force the governments of individual states that are not democratic to act.  Take Egypt for example.  A popular overthrow of the government would not truly have been possible without the rising public opinion of the Arab spring or without the support of other publics around the world urging their government to support the people’s bid for a change.  With that said, democratic accountability certainly makes the public sphere exerting its will substantially easier.

2. Does the global public sphere have the ability to declare action?

I also believe the answer to this question is yes.  The ability of the public to declare action internationally is something that we see time and again in the form of popular protests.  Take for example the Occupy movement, which we saw spread throughout the world in 2011.  The global public sphere declared their thoughts and beliefs in unison, demonstrating to the world that they had the ability to do so.  The ability to declare action is a far cry from authorizing that action, though, as we’ll get to in the next question.

3. Does the public have the authority to declare action?

I do not believe the global public sphere has the authority to declare action on the international level.  In the end, the actions of states depend on those powerful few that preside over the governments in charge of them.  They are the ones who authorize international action.  Even in democratically elected governments, where citizens authorize the powerful few to govern, they do not ultimately hold the power to force those in command to make certain decisions.  They have the ability to declare that international action be taken, but they do not have the authority to make it happen.

4.  Is there one global public sphere or can there be smaller, regional concentrations?

I believe the two possible answers to these questions are not mutually exclusive, and each could apply depending on the situation you are applying it to.  If, for example, there is an international issue that has effects on the southeastern countries in Asia, would the public sphere not merely be the public of those countries?  Similarly, if there is an issue like poverty that affects every country in the world, the public sphere would be expanded to the entire globe.  I believe it is the scope of the issue at hand that determines the scope of the public sphere.

The Celebrity of Kony

I ended up with Invisible Children for my group project this week, which presented some challenges, since that NGO is just a team of four people now who are completing the final processes of dissolving the organization.  I didn't have a ton of advice to offer them for any future goals.  But it did get me thinking about our interesting debate in class last week about this idea of celebrity pushing political movements.  

I remember when I first started hearing about this whole Kony 2012 "experience."  I concentrated in African politics for my undergraduate degree and it never occurred to me as I started seeing the hoopla on Facebook that all of these posts from middle-aged white American teenagers could possibly be about the LRA.  I would have never guessed that someone putting together one video made by a Western film crew could ever be seen as a legitimate representation of what is a very complicated situation.  I don't want to mince words here, Joseph Kony is obviously a horrible human being, but since when does a half hour video that your friend "liked" count as a way to educate yourself regarding African conflicts surrounded in centuries of history and context that no foreigner could ever grasp.

I'm gonna confess to something: I have never watched Kony 2012.  I thought about it this past week when I was tasked with discussing Invisible Children.  But I couldn't do it.  The celebrity frenzy of this film was truly disgusting to me.  It was entertainment.  People didn't care about this issue or have any ideas of how it could be addressed, they liked tweeting about it and feeling good about how cultured they were.  It was gross - and I am now not just a little bit happy that Invisible Children is shutting its doors.  These civil disputes within African states are incredibly complex and even the ICC is having a very hard time learning how to properly address them.  But I can put much more faith in a respected international judicial organization that I can in a bunch of upper-middle class kids sleeping in a park (still unclear what that accomplished).  I had the pleasure of meeting Paul Kagame and as a state leader and one who had experienced a long civil war first hand, he was humble enough to admit that he could not always provide a clear solution because of the muddled nature of these disputes.  Yet we watched these filmmakers discuss their expertise and their success without one shred of self-awareness.  So as much as I have seen the professional benefits of the celebrity and social buzz campaigns in their ability to raise awareness, the paparazzi-esque campaign of Kony 2012 was a disgrace.  Hopefully other NGOs have learned a lesson from that.

Virtual Recourse

In Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s Activists Beyond Borders they argue that advocacy networks build “new links among actors in civil societies, states, and international organizations,” multiplying “the channels of access to the international system.”

This article provides an interesting set of observations on the transformation of the global system to provide individuals with recourse beyond their sovereign states and direct access to the international community. International advocacy networks do this by framing issues to attract attention and encourage action and promoting norm implementation by pressuring target actors.

The process of an actor within an intransigent state using the international community to put pressure on that state is known as the boomerang model, shown in the diagram below:

One of the biggest transformations of this model has been caused by the internet and globalization.

Virtual Boomerang

The role of overseas NGO’s advocating on behalf of human rights victims around the world is increasingly being supplanted by virtual advocacy. Websites like Twitter, Change.org and Avaaz create a digital community of activists who can pressure states and corporations. [1] Rodriguez-Garavito points out that the weakness of internet-based advocacy “is the obverse of its highly disruptive and oportune power, that is, its inability to sustain collaboration over time and transform disruption into lasting influence.”

The danger with digital advocacy is that it trades the expertise and experience from traditional NGOs for the twitting of a mass of uninformed, transiently passionate westerners. Johanna Herman, Research Fellow at the Center on Human Rights in Conflict, outlines the issues that this creates: “millions of people tweeted their support, but for different reasons. There was no easy solution and no obvious next steps in either case for the international community.”[2] (#BringBackOurGirls, #Kony2012). It’s not surprising that these campaigns have been decried as a superficial extension of white guilt or the sham empathy and groupthink.  

This leads to an important question: does the virtual boomerang detract from the effectiveness of traditional advocacy?

Ultimately, I side with Johanna Herman in concluding that: “we should be optimistic that a new space has been created which provides an opportunity for education and a platform for action. For issues to do with international affairs, international justice and human rights that can seem far away, social networking provides the opportunity to make them feel real and closer to home.”[3]

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[1] Cesar Rodriguez-Garavito, “Multiple boomerangs: new models of global human rights advocac ,” OpenDemocracy, 21 January 2015. (Accessed online 28 March 2015 https://www.opendemocracy.net/author/c%C3%A9sar-rodr%C3%ADguezgaravito)

[2] Johanna Herman, “Hashtags and Human Rights: Activism in the Age of Twitter,” Newsweek, 11 December 2014, (Accessed online 28 March 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/hashtags-and-human-rights-activism-age-twitter-290950)

[3] Ibid. 

Celebrity Advocacy and Change

Celebrity advocacy was a contentious topic during this evenings class, especially within the context of contradicting arguments from Emily and Hannah on the issue. Piqued by the prospects of an emotional showdown between Emily, Heribert Dieter, and Rajiv Kumar, I’ve decided to wade into the discussion. 

Celebrity advocacy in the global public sphere of international relations has both positive and negative results. In advocacy success stories, the celebrity is highly committed to the cause and takes the time to understand the complexity of global issues.

Positive Results

Landmines

Princess Diana is one of the most well-known examples of celebrity advocacy in the global sphere, championing a global moratorium on landmines and treatment for AIDS victims.

While many might assume her predominant role was to raise public awareness on these issues, Dan Brockington argues that “much of the work was done behind the scenes with elites... it was her influence on many diplomats who were doing the actual negotiation that was vital.”[1]^,[2]

Other positive examples:[3]

Darfur

Mia Farrow and Steven Spielberg successfully pressured China to use its influence to put a UN peace keeping force in Darfur. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/13/washington/13diplo.html

Africa and Aids

Bono has been a staunch advocate for improving policies to empower Africa. The policies he has advocated for paid dividends: (According to his TED speaker profile) “eight million people are now on life preserving antiretoviral medications, malarial death rates have been halved in eight target countries, 50 million more children are in school and 5.4 million lives have been saved through vaccines.” https://www.ted.com/speakers/bono

Refugees

Angelina Jolie and refugees. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-2927947/Angelina-Jolie-visits-Iraq-highlight-dire-needs-refugees.html

Negative Results

There are also numerous negative examples of how celebrity activism has harmed causes or perpetuated negative situations.

Hanoi Jane

Move star Jane Fonda opposed the Vietnam War, and went as far as visiting Hanoi, Vietnam, accusing the U.S. of humanitarian crimes and posing with Vietnamese forces. She told 60 minutes on March 31, 2005 that “"The image of Jane Fonda, Barbarella, Henry Fonda's daughter ... sitting on an enemy aircraft gun was a betrayal ... the largest lapse of judgment that I can even imagine."[4]

Jenny McCarthy

The former playboy playmate turned TV host came out as a staunch opponent of the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine and other vaccines after her son contracted autism. Despite overwhelmingly scientific evidence demonstrating that the MMR vaccine did not cause measles, McCarthy told Time Magazine in 2010 that “that’s a lie and we’re sick of it,” along with a lot of other insightful and scientific arguments.[5] Her actions have detrimentally impacted global health by discouraging the incidence of vaccination, especially among the affluent and stupid.

Dennis Rodman and North Korea

No explanation necessary.

And now to appease my sociopathic urge to mock hashtags:

#Kony2012

Kony2012 was an early example of viral social movements, and demonstrated how social movements with unprecedented momentum and public opinion often miss the mark: both in terms of educating the public and translating into meaningful achievements. Dr. Beatrice Mpora, director of community health organization Kairos, which dealt with the aftermath of the conflict in Uganda, lamented that “what that video says is totally wrong, and it can cause us more problems than help us.”[6] All this despite star power from Obama, Oprah Winfrey, Rihanna, Kim Kardashian, and Diddy.

#BringBackOurGirls

Michelle Obama was conscientious enough to champion the cause of 276 Nigerian girls who were kidnapped by Boko Haram from boarding school in April 2014, launching the twitter hashtag pictured above. Al Jazeera noted that despite trending on twitter, “the mass abduction that drew global shock, condemnation, and media attention has since been largely forgotten,” leaving the families feeling abandoned.[7]

Criticisms and Conclusions on Celebrity Advocacy

One of the most common criticisms of celebrity advocacy is that it actually decreases public engagement. Examples of this paradox include Kony2012 and Bring Back Our Girls movements, where numerous people jumped on a viral social cause without bothering to understand the situation. After studying the issue, Brockington explains that:

“Celebrity advocacy, which is now so well organized by NGOs, marks, ironically, a disengagement between the public and politics, and particularly between the public and the civil society organizations that try to represent development and humanitarian needs.”

A second significant criticism is that celebrity criticism is just advocacy by elites, for elites. Dan Brockington argues that “celebrity advocacy works with elites, despite its lack of resonance with much of the public, because elites believe it to.”[8]

The caption for the photo above was “U2 frontman Bono walks with President Bush in March after rallying support for relieving Third World debt.”[9] Bono went on to state that “George kind of knocked it out of the park” with his PEPFAR AIDS initiative and other foreign aid to the struggling continent.[10]

Despite these issues, there is little doubt that many celebrities can use their clout to impact the world for good- especially when they are committed to a cause and take the time to understand the complexity of global issues.

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[1] Brockington, Dan. Celebrity advocacy and international development. Routledge, 2014., p. 8[2] Ibid., 9

[3] Thrall, A. Trevor, Jaime Lollio-Fakhreddine, Jon Berent, Lana Donnelly, Wes Herrin, Zachary Paquette, Rebecca Wenglinski, and Amy Wyatt. "Star power: Celebrity advocacy and the evolution of the public sphere." The international journal of press/politics 13, no. 4 (2008): 362-385. p. 363

[4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jane_Fonda#Opposition_to_Vietnam_War

[5] Karl Taro Greenfeld, “The Autism Debate: Who's Afraid of Jenny McCarthy?” Time, 25 February 2010

[6] Mike Pflanz, “Joseph Kony 2012: growing outrage in Uganda over film,” The Telegraph, 08 Mar 2012

[7] Ashionye Ogene, “Abandonment of 'Bring Back Our Girls'” Al Jazeera, 14 October 2014

[8] Brockington, Dan. Celebrity advocacy and international development. Routledge, 2014., 8

[9] http://enquirer.com/editions/2002/12/06/tem_bono06.html

[10] http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/04/george-w-bushs-legacy-on-africa-wins-praise-even-from-foes/

The Efficacy of Celebrity Diplomacy

According to Andrew Cooper, diplomacy has three dimensions in addressing communication, representation, and reproduction of international society. Successful diplomacy is defined as having a sense of purpose, the ability to interact with high-ranking state representatives, and be of global outreach. Usually celebrities, whether Hollywood or corporate “stars,” are self-appointed and lack a mandate to become an active global player. They usually have charisma and the funds to advocate their respective cause, or know who the movers and shakers are to get their cause recognized and financially supported. Cooper mentioned that the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation funded $1.55 billion in charitable work in 2005 and compared it to the World Health Organization’s budget of $1.65 billion in 2007. Of course, we also must remember that Bill Gates is among the world’s richest people, and charity is a means of tax reduction. While Bill and Melinda Gates are in a position to hire experts to handle their foundation, not all celebrities have training or expertise on the causes they are championing. Often international organizations, such as special branches of the United Nations, will hire celebrities to draw attention to their causes. This also provides the celebrity with a credibility factor of doing good work and the resulting lime light might help their repudiation and career.

Being associated with a celebrity might result in negative media coverage and embarrassment to an organization and cause if his or her behavior does not fit the requested profile. On the other hand, there are celebrities, such as Bono, who seem untouchable to any criticism. Bono has teamed up with U.S. economist Jeffrey Sachs, who has a one-dimensional vision for solving Africa’s problems: give Africa aid, waive its debt, and provide education. Aid in itself will not accomplish anything if African people are not trained to help themselves. Also, is this aid based on what foreigners think Africa needs or is it based on what Africans think they need? Do African countries have the institutions and infrastructure in place to use aid monies efficiently, without it sinking and disappearing in a river of corruption and unauthorized uses? Dieter and Kumar also pointed out that Bono’s DATA (Debt, Aids, Trade, Africa) organization has no African board members and only one of five offices is actually located in Africa.

I agree that celebrity diplomats can be very effective in raising both awareness and funds; however, in order to evaluate their effectiveness and efficiency, I would like to see financial and performance reports that provide measure specific objectives and their progress of implementation. Neither reading allows me to make that determination

 

 

References:

Andrew F. Cooper, “Beyond Hollywood and the Boardroom: Celebrity Diplomacy,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (2007).

Heribert Dieter and Rajiv Kumar, “The Downside of Celebrity Diplomacy: The Neglected Complexity of Development,” Global Governance 14 (2008).

UN Goodwill Ambassadors and Celebrity Diplomacy

In their article The Downside of Celebrity Diplomacy: The Neglected Complexity of Development, Dieter and Kumar argue that "celebrities are ill-equipped to solve Africa's problems," that an increased celebrity presence in the domains of diplomacy and development would lead to a "further trivialization of development challenges," and that the consequences of such an increased presence are "simply too negative to contemplate" (2008; 263). Yet the close-minded view that these scholars take of the importance of global public awareness of issues and the role that celebrities will (almost inevitably) play in that same sphere of public awareness trivializes, in turn, their more legitimate argument that celebrities may be ill-equipped to address certain areas of policy.

Let's begin with the phrase "simply to negative to contemplate," a most dramatic ending to the impassioned conclusion of this paper. Is it not, first and foremost, the task of scholars to contemplate the possible consequences of future courses of action? Avoiding the potential realities of a situation seems counterproductive at best. The question should not be will celebrity diplomacy continue to be a reality, but rather, how can we maximize the utility of celebrity diplomacy and minimize its drawbacks? Dieter and Kumar are so atremble at the former question that they do not even attempt to address the latter, with the consequence that their scholarship, such as it is, contains no useful quality except, possibly, to frighten the reader.

Second, the pair seems to have a real bone to pick with Bono. Dieter and Kumar derail the legitimacy of celebrities on the strength of U2's financial success, and likewise lambast "celebrity competence" because they disagree with Bono's choice of economic policy advisors. Using one, albeit one important, example of a celebrity with whose choices these two authors do not agree hardly proves that celebrity diplomacy must be detrimental.

Despite poorly buttressing their arguments, Dieter and Kumar touch upon some important aspects of celebrity diplomacy. It is true that there can be risks associated with the acquisition of social, and some measure of political, power by figures who are not held accountable within the political system. It may even be the case that it is not the place of celebrities to propose sweeping solutions to global problems, which are often more complex than they appear on the outset. It is, however, necessary to acknowledge that in this age of increasing interconnectedness, the role that celebrities play as public figures, and the strength of their voices when they choose to speak out about politics, are too significant to be ignored — but not, let us be clear, "too negative to contemplate."

A more productive approach might be to examine some celebrities who are navigating the delicate path between fame and activism in a way that is likely to benefit the people they are trying to help. Emma Watson is a good example. A U.N. Goodwill Ambassador and spokesperson for HeForShe, a "solidarity movement for gender equality." The basic premise of HeForShe is that the gender equality movement must include the active participate of both sexes, not simply women fighting for women. Watson's role is primarily in raising awareness of the campaign and its goals, as well as emphasizing (for example, in a speech at the United Nations) the positive impact that gender equality can and will have around the world. I would argue that her advocacy is a good model for celebrity diplomacy. She is not proposing one-size-fits-all solutions, but she believes that her voice is just as worthy of being heard as any politician's. And she has brought to the forefront of the public consciousness an issue that has not, historically, had a preeminent place on the floor of global policy debates.

The "Western" Problem of Human Rights

When reading Risee, Ropp, and Sikkink, I was very troubled by one of the sentences in which they began to introduce one of their main theses.  After a bit of a preamble, this sentence appeared: "In sum, we argue that the diffusion of international norms in the human rights area crucially depends on the establishment and the sustainability of networks among domestic and transnational actors who manage who manage to link up with international regimes, to alert Western opinion and Western governments."  Aside from the syntax of the sentence (which I find very vocally awkward), I was also irritated by the way in which the idea of Western knowledge of human violations was presented in a way which would suggest that this particular cognizance is a critical and righteous step toward the correction of such abuses. As if to say that the redemption of human rights abuses is a single-tracked and unstoppable train - and all of these steps must come in this order, and the process is always completed once started.  Well what about when Western states are the violators?

This month, several Senators toured Guantanamo Bay Detention Center where the United States houses terrorism suspects, few of which will ever face trial or even be formally charged.[1]  According to a recent Washington Post Article, there are currently 122 prisoners there.  And that would be a shocking number, if we weren't even more startled by the previous high number held there - 779.[2]  The authors of our articles discuss several key elements of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the first of which is the right to life.  They go on to define this as "the right to be free from extrajudicial execution and disappearance."  I can hardly think of a place where a human being can more "disappear" than Guantanamo Bay.  And the extrajudicial nature in which it is occurring is truly in violation of the spirit of the Human Rights Declaration, among other treaties.

So the authors leave a huge hole in this sentence and the logic that follows.  Western States commit human rights violations, too.  Meaning that the violations are always known by these states; indeed they are premeditated, formulated, and executed by them.  But that in no way begins a process that will lead to the end of such abuses.  They continue under the guise of Western "know-how" and "greater good."  In this way, I disagree with the authors and I think that this view of human rights violations as an occurrence seen strictly in the non-Western world is not only insulting and inaccurate, it is an undeniable catalyst to the atrocities seen in places like Guantanamo.

1. http://www.providencejournal.com/article/20150320/NEWS/150329827/13943
2. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/18/obama-guantanamo-bay-prison_n_6897502.html

The Sovereignty Dilemma

At the beginning of this article, Inayatullah tells his readers that the “principle of nonintervention constrains traditional empire building”.[1]  It seems that it is this role of sovereign states that really forms the international realm as we know it.  Inayatullah further reminds us that “scholars and policymakers increasingly argue that the principle of sovereignty acts as an impediment toward improving the global condition”.[2] The impediments Inayatullah refers to are the limitations that the law of sovereignty places on groups outside of a sovereign state that interfere with major humanitarian movements that seem necessary from those actors outside the state, as well as those actors that are affected by atrocities such as genocide and persecution.  

 

Inayatullah states that, “the conventionally recognized and discussed tension between the dysfunctions and achievements of sovereignty is part of the political setting of what I refer to as the sovereignty dilemma”.[3] This really sums up this confliction of rights between actors in the international realm.  I find myself in a very selfish mindset, because I would want my thoughts on major humanitarian efforts or environmental issues to be able to override the sovereignty of the place misusing their power in order to restore justice appropriately, but on the other hand I would not want another group of people to impose their values on me and my sovereign state.  I recognize how this logic is problematic.  

 

According to Inayatullah, there are two ways in which we can think of this issue;“either we respect the sovereignty principle and seek permission from the very state agents whose purificatory national agenda may have motivated global humanitarian concerns in the first place, or we press our agenda (somehow having made a judgment about its superiority) without the permission of state agents and, consequently, erode and delegitimize sovereignty for all states”.[4] It seems that this topic can go hand in hand with the past week’s module about international law and the complexities that go with enforcing international law because of sovereignty.

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[1] Naeem Inayatullah, “Beyond the Sovereignty Dilemma: Quasi- States as Social Construct,” in State Sovereignty as Social Construct,ed. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber
(Cambridge, 1996).

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.