Global Leadership and U.S. Decline

In our discussion of threats facing the United States, a lot of focus was placed on acute threats to power. Global warming, global extremists, cyber terrorism, and government shutdowns, etc., were expressed in terms of dire physical and economic consequences. The debate in many ways devolved to Live Free and Die Hard versus the Day After Tomorrow versus Olympus Has Fallen/"24", each expressing alarmist worse case scenarios for U.S. power. Rather than siding with any of the more acute scenarios provided in class, I will offer a more rational vision of the future:

There is reason to believe that the U.S. soft power is in decline, as a result of failing to achieve military objectives, political and moral failings in foreign policy, failure to foster peace and diplomatic understanding, political infighting, the spread of global governance and international norms, globalization, etc.  Mahatma Ghandi explained that “leadership at one time meant muscles, but today it means getting along with people.”[1] Soft Power is the “ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and values.”[2] Soft power exists because the rest of the world recognizes it exists. The United States is the “leader of the free world” because other countries follow us, and our global leadership is in decline and threatened.

The U.S. frequently sides with its perceived “interests” in the “ideas versus interests” paradox, abandoning international norms (think CIA Black Sites, Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, CIA torture reports, Drone Strikes, support for Saudi Arabia, etc., etc.) U.S. leadership failures are not a new development or a product of the war on terror- Kissinger’s foreign policy was morally atrocious, and he defended himself by declaring that “A country that demands moral perfection in its foreign policy will achieve neither perfection nor security.”[3]

Globalization and the spread of democratic norms means that the importance of soft power is growing, and U.S. excesses and failures in leadership are increasingly harming U.S image. The European Union and International Organizations are increasingly offering an ideological alternative to the U.S. for like-minded western powers. Kay King, vice president of the Council of Foreign Relations states that the U.S. “inability to tackle tough problems, both domestic and international, has serious national security consequences, in part because it leads the world to question U.S. global leadership.”[4] Kristin Lord analyzes this trend for Foreign Policy, wondering “how much damage must the United States suffer before it learns to take soft power more seriously and, finally, learn to use it more proactively?”[5] How do we go from winning the Nobel Peace Prize to earning widespread condemnation on human rights from the likes of Human Rights Watch, China, and ISIS?

The greatest threat to U.S. power is our failure to lead.

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[1] Vineet Nayar, “Leadership Redefined,” Harvard Business Review, September 23, 2008 https://hbr.org/2008/09/leadership-redefined/

[2] Joseph S. Nye Jr., “The Decline of America's Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs, June 2004

[3] Wawrytko, Sandra Ann, ed. The Problem of Evil: An Intercultural Exploration. Vol. 90. Rodopi, 2000.

[4] Kenneth R. Bazinet, “CFR: Gridlock in Congress Threatens National Security,” New York Daily News, 22 February 2013

[5] Kristin Lord, “Soft Power Outage,” Foreign Policy¸ December 23, 2014 http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/23/soft-power-outage/

The Last Debate

Our last debate was extremely interesting and I think two main points were brought up that will stick with me:  First, there are many different ways in which one can measure or view power.  Second, power is a multi-faceted and fickle quality.

I really started thinking about power and just what that means.  Yes, the US has the largest military in the world and it is more capable and better trained than any force is the history of mankind.  This cannot be separated from my perception of what level of power we possess.  To pretend that might and power are not closely related with each influencing the other is completely pointless.  However, this has been the case for a long time, and I would argue that during the height of US isolationism when we refused to join the League of Nations and remained formally separate from its progress, our power was limited, regardless of the size of our military.  I would argue that our power has grown exponentially since WWII and the formation of the UN, even as our military personnel numbers have shrunk.  The reason being is that the US has institutionalized it realm of influence and has been able to enshrine its influence in both diplomatic and economic issues.  So power right now seems to be a lofty position in a negotiation, but also the weight of enforcement during any debates.

Lastly, anything can drastically influence the power structure.  During the Cold War, the United States had autonomy and immunity in many matters of international relations as it pursued the Western interests in opposition to the USSR.  Had the Bay of Pigs happened in the 2000's, the international reaction would have been overwhelming.  Of course this is, in part, due to the access that most of the world now has to instantaneous news sources.  But even accounting for that, the US does not have the power that it once did, as there is no longer and opponent or an other.  Which goes to show that winning a prolonged conflict can, in reality, decrease the power of another state.

Political Division for a Nuclear Iran

As I'm sure everyone saw, a group of Senators recently penned an open letter to Iran revealing the political division that has formed a gulf in the middle of the US foreign policy strategy.  Recently, however, the NYTimes published an opinion piece about the unanimous legislation that recently passed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, giving Congress a powerful seat at the Iran negotiations.  The Obama Administration initially threatened to veto the bill, but relented when threatened by a bi-partisan override.

In our groups and for the debate, we only spoke about political division in terms of political parties, but this article got me thinking about the growing divide between the legislative and administrative branches.  Now, it was brought up in the debate that this is perhaps the essence of democracy, and I couldn't disagree more.  Debate is inherent to democracy; division and disagreement for the sake of raising one's own profile and political clout is not.  And that is what I keep seeing more and more between these two branches.  The executive branch continues to try and expand its wartime powers, and has even far expanded the definition of war in order to accomplish that.  Gone are the days where the President would address Congress to request a declaration of war.  Additionally, roles normally reserved for the Administration are now being infringed.  In fact, both sides of aisle can come together in agreement to increase their own political standing in this debate.  It seems to me that this reshaping of the roles of the branches should be discussed more as a type of division as we seek to determine the detriment that it could present.

1. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/15/opinion/a-reckless-act-in-the-senate-on-iran.html?_r=0

The Final Debate

The final blog entry in this course is dedicated to our class debate on what was the greatest threat to U.S. power. My initial thought was that the main threat surely must represent a large umbrella that covered multiple threats, which in the right combination and timing, could indeed push the United States of America into joining the ranks of those great powers that went before into drastic decline. I would say that threats vary greatly; depending on the ideas and interests of a country and its people.

I was part of Team 4. We chose cyber terrorism as the largest threat against U.S. hegemonic power. While I don't believe that cyber terrorism (alone) is a threat to U.S. power, I do believe that a cyber-attack by a non-state actor would turn into an unprecedented security threat for the U.S. We are living in an internet-determined world order where conflict, cooperation and strategy are all inevitably tied to individual or group applications of IT. Cyber war capacities  are no longer the domain of only big guns like China and the U.S. They are spreading horizontally to middle and even minor powers; including non-state actors. In fact, today non-state actors have the ability to launch cyber-attacks against their enemy without much repercussion. Cyber terrorism is a threat to U.S. power because it is our greatest immediate vulnerability and if an enemy state or non-state actor wanted to offset the current balance of power they would most likely come up with a less predictable preemptive strategy such as attacking our online databases.

It was a delight to have different perspectives debated. One realization was the importance of being able to debate for the sake of debate, as it certainly was an acquired skill set. Each team had good arguments and let open some loopholes, which is expected considering the time constraint. An interesting observation for me was to see how each threat that the teams’ came up with had valid (and sometimes concerning) points. I think it brought full circle what we have been learning all semester - and that is simply that your perception of global affairs is strongly influenced and determined by the school of thought that you tend to fall into.

All Theory Revised: End of Semester Reflection

In "The Balance of Power in the Balance," Daniel Nexon attempts to discern whether enough counter-evidence has accumulated against traditional balance of power theory that we can abandon it, or whether it should simply be revised. This method of looking at theories as correct or incorrect, abandoning them or updating them, may not be the best way of utilizing theory to inform our worldviews. A view can be useful and worth considering even while not be correct. So long as there is some rationale behind a view that at one point seemed logical, there is space to utilize that view, even if events do not turn out precisely as a particular school of thought would predict.

We have gone through this cycle of thinking all semester; indeed, we see it recur whenever we pose binary questions: Do states act based on interests or ideas? Does coercion or rationality govern the international sphere? The balance-of-power question is only the latest one. But the truth, too often, is that while one side or the other might be "proven right" if events bear out their predictions, there are too many variables involved in real-life situations for one side to ever guarantee the predictive power of their theory.

That does not mean theories are useless. Rather, the realities of international politics mean that all theories are of limited utility, which in turn means that it is more useful to understand actors' behavior through several lenses than it is to "pick" a theory and expect it to hold true in all cases.

So perhaps the strongest lesson I have learned this semester is: It's way easier to understand things in hindsight than it is to predict them, because people and states have lots of different reasons for their behavior. It's quite enough to just try and keep up.

The Likeliness of Hegemonic Institutions

After our week 14 live session, I began to consider the four institutions presented by Professor Jackson.  Like most of the class, I found the idea of hegemonic institutions to be the most likely and persuasive.  

Like most realists, I see the growth of institutions to be an extension of the existing power structure established by the most powerful states.  Yes, there has been a large increase in cooperation, but on the terms of the most powerful.  As this system become more and more established, all of the states will continue to follow this comfortable structure.  This system provides security and economic stability for those who cooperate.  

The predictability of this system is what I believe will cause it to prevail over the other three.  With each area of global interaction, the rules have become more and more established and the accepted behavior of states has become more standardized.  Economic disputes are settled within the WTO and the adherence to its rulings is extremely, especially when considering the lack of enforcement.  The number of states who have given authority to the ICC is overwhelming, the trade cooperation of the EU is unprecedented, and the UN continues to serve as a forum for facilitating almost all major international and diplomatic activity.  With this level of cooperation and satisfaction among both the most and least powerful states, I think that the hegemonic institutions are even more likely to remain than ever before.

Alternative Outcomes in International Relations

In his asynchronous soliloquy this week, Professor Jackson introduces several "scenarios" as possible futures for the international realm, which could supercede the historic rise and fall of great powers and incessant competition for power among them. The first scenario is hegemonic institutions, backed by a great power and the threat of coercive force; the second is constitutional moments, in which states would cooperate in what they perceived to be a common goal; and the third Jackson names the "human project," in which all of humanity would unite for the common good.

As Jackson points out, the prospects for the "human project" seem dim, given the very human tendency to a) form subgroups within a population and b) only unite against a common enemy. But this analysis is outdated because the communication and social constraints that once governed human interaction are loosening as technology advances.

It is true that the modern world contains people of strongly, even violently, opposing viewpoints. It is also true that the media too often plays a divisive rather than unitary role as it serves as the medium between people in different parts of the world. But increasing access to a variety of media sources and individuals' stories means that it is harder for a single story to manipulate large numbers of people.

It may not happen this generation, nor even the one after. But rapidly increasing access to information worldwide means that we will eventually have a better idea of whether humans, unfettered by biased media or self-interested governments, desire or are capable of the "human project." Perhaps they (we) will reject it; perhaps not. Only time will tell. It is premature, however, to assume that only an extraterrestrial enemy is capable of uniting the human race.

When International Norms Don't Become Domestic Practice

In their chapter on "The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practice," Risse and Sikkink discuss the role that transnational advocacy networks play in process of norm diffusion in the international sphere. They point out that such networks are able to create a dual pressure, coming "from above" (moral consciousness raising among other states) and "from below" (the legitimization of the claims of domestic opposition group), to induce states to adopt domestic human rights policies that they might otherwise not. [1]

States react to the pressure to change in different ways. There is a spectrum of conforming behavior, from tactical concessions to actual rule-consistent behavior. But of course, there are also states which remain in the initial response phases described by Risse and Sikkink, "repression of network" and "denial." [2] Of course, every state under pressure has its price, it just depends on whether the international community is ready and willing to pay it.

The strength of the pressure applied to non-conforming states varies with the will of other key state actors. This brings us back to the interests versus ideas dichotomy. How much are states willing to sacrifice their interests in the name of ideas?

As an extreme example, let's briefly examine North Korea in this context. This is a state whose government has been exposed to constant moral "shaming," whose economy is shockingly unproductive compared to its southern neighbor, and whose relations with other countries have been stilted at best for decades. In 2013, North Korea's GNI was only $1,200 per capita, while South Korea's GNI was $26,200 per capita. [3] NK has ratified several key human rights treaties, but according to Human Rights Watch, continues with its policy of "systematic denial of basic freedoms in the country." [4]

Awareness has been raised in the international community, which is the pressure "from above" that Risse and Sikkink speak of. What appears to be missing from this equation is the element of pressure "from below," which would involve domestic opposition groups. The repression of free speech in NK is so extreme that there appear to be few, if any, domestic opposition groups to be legitimated. The pressure "from above" would have to be greatly increased to compensate, but that has yet to happen. My best guess is that for other states, it is more in their interest to condemn from a distance than to take action that might have real consequences.

[1] Risse, Thomas and Kathryn Sikkink. "The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms Into Domestic Practice." The Power of Human Rights. p.5.
[2] Ibid, p.22.
[3] "North Korea's Economy: Spring Release."  The Economist. Published 28 Feb. 2015; accessed 6 April 2015. http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21645252-tantalising-signs-change-are-emerging-whether-they-signal-more-profound-shifts-less
[4] "North Korea." Human Rights Watch, World Report 2014. http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/north-korea

The Strange Bedfellows: Chinese and American Foreign Policy in East Asia

Balance of power politics in East Asia is a topic of special interest within the context of the rise and fall of great powers like the United States and China. Marc Beeson’s article, “Hegemonic transition in East Asia? The Dynamics of Chinese and American Power”, offers an interesting perspective on Chinese foreign policy, stating that “it is clear that China is not yet – and possibly may never be – in a position to replace the US as the dominant power in the region.”[1] Several paragraphs later, Beeson concludes that “despite the apparent durability of American leadership, its relationship with East Asia generally and China in particular, suggest that this dominance is declining and may be less substantial than it appears.”[2]

Traditional power politics would suggest a tug-of-war relationship between the U.S. and China, with each state seeking to exert its influence in mutually strategic zones. A cursory analysis of chest-pounding in the South China Sea seems to reflect this idea. Yan Xuetong, President of the Carnegie Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, argues that “China and the United States are vying with each other not only in Southeast Asia but also in many other parts of the world. The global framework is shifting from being unipolar to being bipolar, not multipolar. That change derives from an objective shift in power.”[3] These power dynamics have led some to refer to the competition between the United States and China as “the cool war.”

This leads us to a more important question, specifically: what theoretical framework should be used to characterize great power relations within the context of international institutions, global governance structures, non-governmental organizations, and the evolving “global public sphere”?

One such framework is offered by international relations scholar Joseph S. Nye Jr., in his article “The Future of American Power.” Nye argues that:

“Power today is distributed in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional chess game. On the top chessboard, military power is largely unipolar, and the United States is likely to retain primacy for quite some time. On the middle chessboard, economic power has been multipolar for more than a decade, with the United States, Europe, Japan, and China as the major players and others gaining in importance. The bottom chessboard is the realm of transnational relations. It includes nonstate actors as diverse as bankers who electronically transfer funds, terrorists who traffic weapons, hackers who threaten cybersecurity, and challenges such as pandemics and climate change. On this bottom board, power is widely diffused, and it makes no sense to speak of unipolarity, multipolarity, or hegemony.”[4]

The implications of this view are significant and far reaching:

The economic and social connections between the U.S. and China on secondary and tertiary “power chessboards” prevent an armed conflict, because both countries recognize it would have drastic and far reaching negative consequences. Yan Xuetong concurs, noting that “recent talk of a “new type of great power relationship” between the United States and China is based on implementing control to avoid military conflict.”[5]

The increasingly global nature of security, economics, and politics also forces the U.S. and China to work together on key issues. Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Advisor for Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, writes that: “The United States has an abiding interest in preserving stability in the U.S.-China relationship so that it can continue to secure Beijing's cooperation on an expanding list of regional and global issues and more tightly integrate China into the prevailing international system.”[6] China holds over one trillion dollars in U.S. debt, and the U.S. is the most significant market for Chinese exports, tying their economic fates in a Gordian knot.[7]

This returns us to the topic of the rise and fall of great powers. Within the context discussed above, one might argue that we have abandoned the model of bipolar relations, and that new power relations with linked interests dominate competition in East Asia.  The “Cool War” describes this paradox between competition and cooperation. Noah Feldman writes in Foreign Policy that “a classic struggle for power between two countries is unfolding at the same time that economic cooperation between them is becoming deeper and more fundamental.”[8] The implications of this relationship are numerous and far reaching, and in many cases, still undefined.

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[1] Beeson, Mark. "Hegemonic transition in East Asia? The dynamics of Chinese and American power." Review of International Studies 35, no. 01 (2009): 95-112.

[2] Ibid., 112

[3] Yan Xuetong and Koichi Furuya, “Conflict Control” is Key to U.S.-China Relations in a Bipolar World”, The Carnegie Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, 14 May 2014 http://carnegietsinghua.org/publications/?fa=55600

[4] Joseph S. Nye, “The Future of American Power”, Foreign Affairs, December 2010

[5] Yan Xuetong and Koichi Furuya, “Conflict Control” is Key to U.S.-China Relations in a Bipolar World”, The Carnegie Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, 14 May 2014 http://carnegietsinghua.org/publications/?fa=55600

[6] Bonnie S. Glaser, “Armed Clash in the South China Sea: Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14,” The Council on Foreign Relations, April 2012 http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883

[7] Eswar Prasad, “The U.S.-China Economic Relationship: Shifts and Twists in the Balance of Power,” The Brookings Institute, February 25, 2010 http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2010/02/25-us-china-debt-prasad

[8] Noah Feldman, “The Unstoppable Force vs. the Immovable Object,” Foreign Policy, May 16, 2013

Anarachy or Sovereignty?

John Ikenberry makes three main arguments in his essay, “Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age.”  The first argument is that imperial temptations can be generated by unipolarity, “ but notions of empire do not adequately capture key features of the political order that have grown up around American power” (Ikenberry, 2004).  The second argument made is that “both liberal and imperial logics are at play in the current American unipolar moment” (Ikenberry, 2004), and it is highlighted that these liberal and imperial logics have been rooted in American diplomacy and political culture.  The third main argument that Ikenberry makes is that “despite Washington's imperial temptation, the US is not doomed to abandon rule-based order” (Ikenberry, 2004).

 

 The section of the article that I found most interesting in relation to this course’s overall theme of sovereignty within the international realm was the section titled Anarchy and Hierarchy.  It is highlighted that “neorealists make the elemental distinction between anarchy and hierarchy. Anarchy is order without central authority” (Ikenberry, 2004).  It is then noted that “In a condition of anarchy, states do not stand in any fixed, formal, or hierarchical relation with one another” (Ikenberry, 2004).  To summarize, there is no hierarchy within anarchy.

The reason that I found this statement so interesting is because within the international realm where each state holds sovereignty, there is still an understood level of hierarchy that the public sees and, for the most part, adheres to.  Even though within anarchy, there is not supposed to be levels of power - it is very easy to have common understandings of what sovereign states are more powerful and hold more weight in the international realm.  I am not saying that everyone sees this ranking the same.   I can imagine that citizens of one country may hold the importance of their country higher than citizens of other countries.  But nonetheless, there are certain norms that imply that some countries or continents are power houses in the international realm.  

Is it possible that this hierarchy of power is an example that each sovereign state may not really be as autonomous and  sovereign as some scholars of the international realm assume?    

 

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Reference: 

John Ikenberry, “Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar Age,” Review of International Studies 30:4 (2004).