In their chapter on "The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practice," Risse and Sikkink discuss the role that transnational advocacy networks play in process of norm diffusion in the international sphere. They point out that such networks are able to create a dual pressure, coming "from above" (moral consciousness raising among other states) and "from below" (the legitimization of the claims of domestic opposition group), to induce states to adopt domestic human rights policies that they might otherwise not. [1]
States react to the pressure to change in different ways. There is a spectrum of conforming behavior, from tactical concessions to actual rule-consistent behavior. But of course, there are also states which remain in the initial response phases described by Risse and Sikkink, "repression of network" and "denial." [2] Of course, every state under pressure has its price, it just depends on whether the international community is ready and willing to pay it.
The strength of the pressure applied to non-conforming states varies with the will of other key state actors. This brings us back to the interests versus ideas dichotomy. How much are states willing to sacrifice their interests in the name of ideas?
As an extreme example, let's briefly examine North Korea in this context. This is a state whose government has been exposed to constant moral "shaming," whose economy is shockingly unproductive compared to its southern neighbor, and whose relations with other countries have been stilted at best for decades. In 2013, North Korea's GNI was only $1,200 per capita, while South Korea's GNI was $26,200 per capita. [3] NK has ratified several key human rights treaties, but according to Human Rights Watch, continues with its policy of "systematic denial of basic freedoms in the country." [4]
Awareness has been raised in the international community, which is the pressure "from above" that Risse and Sikkink speak of. What appears to be missing from this equation is the element of pressure "from below," which would involve domestic opposition groups. The repression of free speech in NK is so extreme that there appear to be few, if any, domestic opposition groups to be legitimated. The pressure "from above" would have to be greatly increased to compensate, but that has yet to happen. My best guess is that for other states, it is more in their interest to condemn from a distance than to take action that might have real consequences.
[1] Risse, Thomas and Kathryn Sikkink. "The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms Into Domestic Practice." The Power of Human Rights. p.5.
[2] Ibid, p.22.
[3] "North Korea's Economy: Spring Release." The Economist. Published 28 Feb. 2015; accessed 6 April 2015. http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21645252-tantalising-signs-change-are-emerging-whether-they-signal-more-profound-shifts-less
[4] "North Korea." Human Rights Watch, World Report 2014. http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/north-korea
States react to the pressure to change in different ways. There is a spectrum of conforming behavior, from tactical concessions to actual rule-consistent behavior. But of course, there are also states which remain in the initial response phases described by Risse and Sikkink, "repression of network" and "denial." [2] Of course, every state under pressure has its price, it just depends on whether the international community is ready and willing to pay it.
The strength of the pressure applied to non-conforming states varies with the will of other key state actors. This brings us back to the interests versus ideas dichotomy. How much are states willing to sacrifice their interests in the name of ideas?
As an extreme example, let's briefly examine North Korea in this context. This is a state whose government has been exposed to constant moral "shaming," whose economy is shockingly unproductive compared to its southern neighbor, and whose relations with other countries have been stilted at best for decades. In 2013, North Korea's GNI was only $1,200 per capita, while South Korea's GNI was $26,200 per capita. [3] NK has ratified several key human rights treaties, but according to Human Rights Watch, continues with its policy of "systematic denial of basic freedoms in the country." [4]
Awareness has been raised in the international community, which is the pressure "from above" that Risse and Sikkink speak of. What appears to be missing from this equation is the element of pressure "from below," which would involve domestic opposition groups. The repression of free speech in NK is so extreme that there appear to be few, if any, domestic opposition groups to be legitimated. The pressure "from above" would have to be greatly increased to compensate, but that has yet to happen. My best guess is that for other states, it is more in their interest to condemn from a distance than to take action that might have real consequences.
[1] Risse, Thomas and Kathryn Sikkink. "The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms Into Domestic Practice." The Power of Human Rights. p.5.
[2] Ibid, p.22.
[3] "North Korea's Economy: Spring Release." The Economist. Published 28 Feb. 2015; accessed 6 April 2015. http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21645252-tantalising-signs-change-are-emerging-whether-they-signal-more-profound-shifts-less
[4] "North Korea." Human Rights Watch, World Report 2014. http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/north-korea
One interesting paradox is how a country may be willing to adopt some or most international norms while breaking with the international communities attempts to spread norms. China complies with substantially more international norms than North Korea, but rejects and interferes with the international communities efforts to pressure the country. China could effect regime change overnight, simply by cutting fuel flow to the country, but chooses not to. This Is often portrayed as an interests over ideals decision, because regime change would probably lead to a democratic reunification of the Koreas. It may also be an idealistic decision, because of China's emphasis on non-interference and state sovereignty. Within this context, it becomes clear that offending nations that ignore international pressure to reform often have autonomous third party enablers- most often China. This reality suggests a diplomatic, international pathway to resolving failed states, and highlights limits in the reach of international norms.
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