The rise of China will likely be the most important international relations story of the twenty-first century, but it remains unclear whether that story will have a happy ending. Will China's ascent increase the probability of great-power war? Will an era of U.S.-Chinese tension be as dangerous as the Cold War? Will it be even worse, because China, unlike the Soviet Union, will prove a serious economic competitor as well as a geopolitical one? Further, is the current international system conducive for a Chinese hegemon?
These issues have been addressed by a wide range of experts -- regionalists, historians, and economists -- all of whom can claim insight into certain aspects of the situation. But China's unique qualities, past behavior, and economic trajectory may well turn out to be less important in driving future events than many assume -- because how a country acts as a superpower and whether its actions and those of others will end in battle are shaped as much by general patterns of international politics as by idiosyncratic factors. Such broader questions about the conditions under which power transitions lead to conflict are precisely what international relations theorists study, so they, too, have something to add to the discussion.
So far, the China debate among international relations theorists has pitted optimistic liberals against pessimistic realists. The liberals argue that because the current international order is defined by economic and political openness, it can accommodate China's rise peacefully. The United States and other leading powers, this argument runs, can and will make clear that China is welcome to join the existing order and prosper within it, and China is likely to do so rather than launch a costly and dangerous struggle to overturn the system and establish an order more to its own liking. [1]
The standard realist view, in contrast, predicts intense competition. China's growing strength, most realists argue, will lead it to pursue its interests more assertively, which will in turn lead the United States and other countries to balance against it.[2] This cycle will generate at the least a parallel to the Cold War standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, and perhaps even a hegemonic war. Adherents of this view point to China's recent harder line on its maritime claims in the East China and South China seas and to the increasingly close relations between the United States and India as signs that the cycle of assertiveness and balancing has already begun.
Current international conditions should enable both the United States and China to protect their vital interests without posing large threats to each other.
In fact, however, a more nuanced version of realism provides grounds for optimism. China's rise need not be nearly as competitive and dangerous as the standard realist argument suggests, because the structural forces driving major powers into conflict will be relatively weak. The dangers that do exist, moreover, are not the ones predicted by sweeping theories of the international system in general but instead stem from secondary disputes particular to Northeast Asia -- and the security prevalent in the international system at large should make these disputes easier for the United States and China to manage. In the end, therefore, the outcome of China's rise will depend less on the pressures generated by the international system than on how well U.S. and Chinese leaders manage the situation. Conflict is not predetermined -- and if the United States can adjust to the new international conditions, making some uncomfortable concessions and not exaggerating the dangers, a major clash might well be avoided.
[1] Bijian,
Zheng (September–October 2005). "China’s
‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status". Foreign Affairs 84
(5): 22. doi:10.2307/20031702. Retrieved 6 December 2012.
[2] Bingguo, Dai (6 December 2010). "Persisting
with Taking the Path of Peaceful Development". Beijing: Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China
Fatima, interesting perspective on China. I tend to fall into the realist camp in thinking that China's ascension will be paired with an increasingly aggressive assertion of foreign policy and economic interests, especially in the South China Sea. The Council on Foreign Relagions concurred, nothing that "Experts say the potential for an escalated conflict in the South China Sea—while seemingly distant for now—presents an ongoing crisis for the region." http://www.cfr.org/china/south-china-sea-tensions/p29790. Conflict could probably be avoided by allowing China to exert its power unchallenged, but the U.S. has chosen to counterbalance by pivoting military forces and resources towards supporting other parties in the region and deterring Chinese aggression.
ReplyDeleteHi Fatima ~ Thanks for a very interesting post! I agree with Ben in that the best chance for avoiding conflict if/when China grows more assertive is for the US to back off in areas where it does not have vital strategic interests.
ReplyDeleteI am curious as to the role of the UN security council moving forward. China and Russia often take similar stances, although they are not officially allies, but China also does not hesitate to abstain or exercise the veto when its interests are at stake. Could this be a forum for promoting understanding between the US and China of how far each country is willing to go to advance or protect its strategic interests?