In his 1988 paper on "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," Kenneth Waltz states that "Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has to seek the approval of other states, but each has to cope with the other." [1] He was referring to the nature of alliances, in which the strongest states have little to gain from alliances compared to weaker states. During the Cold War, the two superpowers had by far the most bargaining power and autonomy within their respective webs of alliances, while other states would seek to ally themselves with either the US or the USSR.
Waltz then asserts, "In a two-power competition, a loss for one is easily taken to be a gain for the other." [2] This was never more true than at the end of the Cold War, when the Soviet economy when into decline and the USSR ultimately dissolved. No new power emerged in the vacuum left by the Soviet Union, so the US stood (and continues to stand, in many ways) as the sole global superpower. At that point, it was not necessary for the US to continue expanding its power; it was necessary only for Soviet power to decline in order for the US role on the world stage to radically alter.
But strangely, despite no longer commanding the Soviet Union or power comparable to that of the US, in some ways modern-day Russia seems to be playing the game of international politics as though it still possessed the power and autonomy it did during the Cold War (relative to other states). Taking a closer look at the way in which Russia has formed alliances since the end of the Cold War can provide insight into the way Russia perceives itself on the international stage and whether Russia perceives itself as neorealism would dictate or not. Does the power-balance theory of neorealism, as articulated by Waltz, hold true for Russia today?
During the Cold War, the USSR signed the Warsaw Pact and allied itself to Albania, Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Republic, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. [3] At that time, the USSR was the leviathan of the alliance, possessing significantly greater military might than the other member states.
After the Soviet Union dissolved and Russia emerged as the successor state, the Warsaw Pact was replaced by the Collective Security Treaty Organization, signed in 1992 and including Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan. The members of CSTO were all post-Soviet states. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan have all withdrawn from CSTO since its formation in 1992. [4]
So the alliance that the USSR had formed with a number of other states under the Warsaw pact was no renewed - and was not adequately replaced, since CSTO did not include any non-former-Soviet states, and in fact only comprised a fraction of former Soviet states. Russia's alliance system contracted significantly after 1991.
In contrast, the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance formed during the Cold War weathered the collapse of the Soviet Union and even expanded in subsequent years. 12 members originally joined NATO in 1949, most notably the United States, and there are currently 28 member states. [5] NATO did need to significantly re-evaluate its mission following the collapse of its raison d'être, the Soviet Union, and there was doubt at the time as to whether the alliance would continue. Ultimately, several members of the former USSR joined NATO, and it is arguably the strongest alliance of states in existence today.
The United States has continued to cultivate alliances with strong states like France and the United Kingdom, while Russia appears increasingly isolated. Nonetheless, Russia continues to behave with a high degree of autonomy, seeming to disregard the opinion of the international community or its diminished strength therein. Recent examples of this include Russia encouraging encouraging separatists in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine now. Russia has not changed its policy towards Ukraine despite sanctions by the US and some of its allies. [6]
Back to neorealism: Waltz implies in his article that being in a position of relative power means that strong states only have to "cope with" other powers, not seek their approval. Given Russia's loss of power since the end of the Cold War, one might expect it to have become less bold in its foreign policy, and have begun courting the approval of other states. The latter, at least, has not happened: Russia's alliances have diminished, not increased, since 1992, and although it has developed a working relationship with China, the two countries have not formed a formal alliance to merge their power. The question remains, is Russia ignoring the realities of global power balances?
I would argue that Russia is not ignoring the global power balance, but rather testing the boundaries of when other states are willing to exercise their power. Thus far, the world's reaction to Russia's actions in Georgia, Ukraine and even Syria has been fairly tepid - not enough to deter the state from pursuing its perceived interests. By testing the limits of what other powers, particularly the US, will allow it to get away with, Russia may be carving out more power for itself simply by means of audacity - playing off of the reluctance of other powers to get involved in a real fight.
[1] Waltz, Kenneth. "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory." The Journal of Interdisciplinary History:1988. Page 9.
[2] Ibid.
[3] "The Warsaw Pact is Formed." 2015. The History Channel Website. Feb. 1, 2015. <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/the-warsaw-pact-is-formed>
[4] "Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)." 2015. Global Security Website. Feb. 1, 2015. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/csto.htm>
[5] "NATO Member Countries." 2015. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Website. Feb. 1, 2015. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm>
[6] Tisdall, Simon. "US increasingly concerned that Russia is intent on partitioning Ukraine." 2 Feb. 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/02/us-russia-ukraine-rebels-weapons-kiev-putin>
Waltz then asserts, "In a two-power competition, a loss for one is easily taken to be a gain for the other." [2] This was never more true than at the end of the Cold War, when the Soviet economy when into decline and the USSR ultimately dissolved. No new power emerged in the vacuum left by the Soviet Union, so the US stood (and continues to stand, in many ways) as the sole global superpower. At that point, it was not necessary for the US to continue expanding its power; it was necessary only for Soviet power to decline in order for the US role on the world stage to radically alter.
But strangely, despite no longer commanding the Soviet Union or power comparable to that of the US, in some ways modern-day Russia seems to be playing the game of international politics as though it still possessed the power and autonomy it did during the Cold War (relative to other states). Taking a closer look at the way in which Russia has formed alliances since the end of the Cold War can provide insight into the way Russia perceives itself on the international stage and whether Russia perceives itself as neorealism would dictate or not. Does the power-balance theory of neorealism, as articulated by Waltz, hold true for Russia today?
During the Cold War, the USSR signed the Warsaw Pact and allied itself to Albania, Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Republic, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. [3] At that time, the USSR was the leviathan of the alliance, possessing significantly greater military might than the other member states.
After the Soviet Union dissolved and Russia emerged as the successor state, the Warsaw Pact was replaced by the Collective Security Treaty Organization, signed in 1992 and including Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan. The members of CSTO were all post-Soviet states. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan have all withdrawn from CSTO since its formation in 1992. [4]
So the alliance that the USSR had formed with a number of other states under the Warsaw pact was no renewed - and was not adequately replaced, since CSTO did not include any non-former-Soviet states, and in fact only comprised a fraction of former Soviet states. Russia's alliance system contracted significantly after 1991.
In contrast, the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance formed during the Cold War weathered the collapse of the Soviet Union and even expanded in subsequent years. 12 members originally joined NATO in 1949, most notably the United States, and there are currently 28 member states. [5] NATO did need to significantly re-evaluate its mission following the collapse of its raison d'être, the Soviet Union, and there was doubt at the time as to whether the alliance would continue. Ultimately, several members of the former USSR joined NATO, and it is arguably the strongest alliance of states in existence today.
The United States has continued to cultivate alliances with strong states like France and the United Kingdom, while Russia appears increasingly isolated. Nonetheless, Russia continues to behave with a high degree of autonomy, seeming to disregard the opinion of the international community or its diminished strength therein. Recent examples of this include Russia encouraging encouraging separatists in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine now. Russia has not changed its policy towards Ukraine despite sanctions by the US and some of its allies. [6]
Back to neorealism: Waltz implies in his article that being in a position of relative power means that strong states only have to "cope with" other powers, not seek their approval. Given Russia's loss of power since the end of the Cold War, one might expect it to have become less bold in its foreign policy, and have begun courting the approval of other states. The latter, at least, has not happened: Russia's alliances have diminished, not increased, since 1992, and although it has developed a working relationship with China, the two countries have not formed a formal alliance to merge their power. The question remains, is Russia ignoring the realities of global power balances?
I would argue that Russia is not ignoring the global power balance, but rather testing the boundaries of when other states are willing to exercise their power. Thus far, the world's reaction to Russia's actions in Georgia, Ukraine and even Syria has been fairly tepid - not enough to deter the state from pursuing its perceived interests. By testing the limits of what other powers, particularly the US, will allow it to get away with, Russia may be carving out more power for itself simply by means of audacity - playing off of the reluctance of other powers to get involved in a real fight.
[1] Waltz, Kenneth. "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory." The Journal of Interdisciplinary History:1988. Page 9.
[2] Ibid.
[3] "The Warsaw Pact is Formed." 2015. The History Channel Website. Feb. 1, 2015. <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/the-warsaw-pact-is-formed>
[4] "Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)." 2015. Global Security Website. Feb. 1, 2015. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/csto.htm>
[5] "NATO Member Countries." 2015. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Website. Feb. 1, 2015. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm>
[6] Tisdall, Simon. "US increasingly concerned that Russia is intent on partitioning Ukraine." 2 Feb. 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/02/us-russia-ukraine-rebels-weapons-kiev-putin>
Hannah - this is a really interesting thought. Looking at Waltz's quote, I would agree that the two superpowers did not need to seek approval. There was only the threat of the other superpower that had to be dealt with in every policy decision. However, it doesn't seem that just because a state should consider the approval of the international community that it necessarily will. It seems like this is what Russia is doing now. I think this is such an interesting point because it seems irrational, but the culture built into the diplomatic arm of each state is not quick to change. Many Russians who were once part of the USSR might still view themselves in the same way, despite their altered status.
ReplyDeleteThis comment has been removed by the author.
ReplyDelete