One of the key issues in international relations as we look
at non-state actors is the idea of legitimacy. Max Weber defines a state as “a
human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of
physical force within a given territory.”[1] Specifically,
what gives a state legitimacy and does the state has a monopoly on the legitimate
exercise of violence?
Many political theorists have commented on the state's
source of legitimacy. John Locke argues that “government is not legitimate
unless it is carried on with the consent of the governed.”[2]
Sociologist Seymour Lipset concurs, explaining that legitimacy describes “the
capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that
existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the
society.”[3]
The implications of this viewpoint are significant- if the
state loses the consent of its people, or a significant portion of them, can
non-state actors with popular support claim legal legitimacy? Numerous non-state
actors have attempted to use this idea of popular mandate to legitimize
violence.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (or FARC) are a
leftist guerilla violent non-state actor in Colombia who oppose the Colombian
government and many of the economic and political effects of globalization.[4] Ana
Maria Montoya evaluated public opinion surveys in Colombia which indicated that
just under 50% of Colombians would accept an elected candidate from the FARC
movement, demonstrating some level of social acceptance and legitimacy.[5] This
local and regional support for the FARC has permitted them to maintain the
claim to legitimate action against the Colombian government, receiving official
recognition as a belligerent force from Hugo Chavez.[6]
This example, along with countless others from revolutions,
civil wars, and violent movements across the globe illustrate the pitfalls posed
by using popular support as the primary source for legitimacy. How might we
propose a better source of legitimacy for the monopolization of violence?
[1] Mitropolitski,
Simeon. "Weber’s Definition of the State as an Ethnographic Tool for
Understanding the Contemporary Political Science State of the Discipline."
Canadian Political Science Association, May 2011,. P. 1
[2] Dunn,
John. "I. Consent in the Political Theory of John Locke." The
Historical Journal 10:2 (1967), p. 153
[3] Fauvelle‐Aymar,
Christine. "The political and tax capacity of government in developing
countries." Kyklos 52, no. 3 (1999): 392
[5] Ana
María Montoya, “Colombians’ Views of the FARC as a Political Party,” AmericasBarometer
Insights: 2014: 107, p. 2
[6]
Chris Kraul, “Chavez keeps up campaign to get rebels off terrorist list,” Los
Angeles Times, 20 January 2008 (Accessed online, 24 February 2015 http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jan/20/world/fg-farc20)
Ben ~ you bring up a tough question at the end of your post. In a brief attempt to answer, I'd suggest that a good way of legitimizing the monopolization of violence is to create a system that is likely to retain legitimacy even when if a particular government loses popularity. A system of checks and balances springs to mind, as well as one in which even non-ruling parties have degrees of control over the state's use of violence.
ReplyDeleteHannah, I think that is a good start. A system of power sharing and checks and balances creates a situation wheresociety as a whole remains commited to working within the system to effect change. One of the factors that appears to facilitate political instability around the world is the inability of a dissenting minority or majority to achieve change within a system, leading them to break with, and delegitimize the system, often violently.
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