The Intersection of Beliefs and Interests on the International Stage

As we progress from the theories of liberalism and realism to evaluate the actions and behaviors of states, we can retain the inherited model of Rational Self-Interest as the guiding force for states when interacting on the international realm. Modern international relations theorists have sought to explain state behavior by adapting rational self-interest to encompass both ideas and interests.[1]

A simple example of where worldviews impacted a state’s decisions in the international realm is Chinese views of sovereignty and its effects on their diplomatic efforts at the United Nations. China is involved in a protracted sovereignty dispute over the territory of Taiwan, which maintains its own government and diplomatic relations.[2] Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane argue that there are three types of ideas or beliefs which impact foreign policy: world views, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs.[3] China has the principled belief that state sovereignty is inviolate. This belief has grown to impact many Chinese actions before the UN Security Council, especially as it relates to Taiwan. China vetoed peacekeeping operations in Guatemala in 1997 and Macedonia in 1999, in response to those countries establishing diplomatic relations with Taiwan.[4] In 1999, as the conflict in Kosovo worsened, the western powers called for military action to restore peace. David Bosco writes that “Russian and China were willing to condemn Serb excesses through tough council resolutions, but they refused to explicitly authorize the use of force. Both countries saw the Western push as a dangerous violation of Serbia's sovereignty.”[5] All three of these examples demonstrate that China was willing to accept some instability and conflict in order to maintain its principled belief that state sovereignty is sacred.

The actions of states when there appears to be a conflict between ideas and interests is an especially important topic of study. The Chinese emphasis on the principle of state sovereignty was tested when Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008.[6] Russia sought to empower separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, effectively annexing territory from Georgia and upending their plan to join NATO, creating a buffer zone between Russia and Eastern Europe.

Image Credit: Wikipedia

China recognized that condemning the Russian incursions on Georgian sovereignty could jeopardize Russian support for any coercive reunification between Taiwan and China. China opted to weaken their stance on national sovereignty rather than condemn Russia’s excesses, offering weak calls for an “Olympic ceasefire” and diplomatic discussions.[7] In this instance, China’s principled belief in national sovereignty was subordinated to its clear interest to have Russian support for Tiawanese reunification.

Image Source: Wall Street Journal

China is increasingly finding it hard to tiptoe the line between supporting sovereignty and condemning their key partner at the UN Security Council. The Diplomat concluded that “China, meanwhile, is trying to tread a fine line on the issue. When asked at a press conference if China would recognize Crimea as part of Russia, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei gave a carefully noncommittal response: “China always respects all countries’ sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The Crimean issue should be resolved politically under a framework of law and order. All parties should exercise restraint and refrain from raising the tension.”[8]

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[1] Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O. Keohane. "Ideas and foreign policy: an analytical framework." Ideas and foreign policy: Beliefs, institutions, and political change (1993): 5

[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_status_of_Taiwan

[3] Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O. Keohane. "Ideas and foreign policy: an analytical framework." Ideas and foreign policy: Beliefs, institutions, and political change (1993):10

[4] Bosco, David L. Five to rule them all: the UN Security Council and the making of the modern world. Oxford University Press, 2009. 208

[5] Ibid., 209

[6] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Georgian_War

[7] Chris Buckley, “China invokes Olympics in urging South Ossetia ceasefire” Reuters, August 8, 2008 (Accessed online January 18, 2015: http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/08/09/us-georgia-ossetia-china-idUSPEK20856020080809)
[8] Shannon Tiezzi, “China Reacts to the Crimea Referendum,” The Diplomat, 18 March 2014 (Accessed online January 18, 2015: http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/china-reacts-to-the-crimea-referendum/