In Chapter XVII of Leviathan, "Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a Commonwealth," Thomas Hobbes delves into the way in which a commonwealth forms and the reasons for its formation. First, however, he describes how and why human organization occurs at all. He begins the chapter with the central conflict of human nature: that men "naturally love liberty, and dominion over others"[1]. Each man wishes to be free, but he also wishes to have power over others, i.e. restrict their freedom. Given that fact, without a system in which men give up their individual power to a higher authority, war "is necessarily consequent" [2]. Men will compete for power and pursue their own security "against all other men" [3]. Over time, this security competition may extend to larger and larger groups, as men form families, then villages, then cities and kingdoms.
In modern-day terms, we can see these "kingdoms" as countries, arguably the largest units that behave with individual sovereignty in the international system. What is true of one man should hold true for a country; it acts in its own best interest, to strengthen itself and weaken its enemies. Hobbes explains that strength is relative, not absolute. A country attains security when "the odds of the enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment to determine the event of war, as to move him to attempt" [4]. In other words, a country is strong enough when its enemies are deterred by its strength from attacking it. Any strength less than that is worthless from a security perspective.
History shows that many countries, particularly relatively powerful ones, accept Hobbes' logic and act accordingly. The Cold War centered around a nuclear arms race between two major powers, the United States and the USSR. The two enemies competed for security in the form of a large enough power differential to deter attack and establish one country as the dominant power. Speaking in more general terms, it is fair to say that in countries which have no expansionist aspirations, militaries exist because other militaries exist.
In a world in which states are the primary actors on the world stage, Hobbesian logic regarding relative power holds. Underlying this logic is an assumption that Hobbes makes in Part 1 of Leviathan, that men are motivated to avoid living in a state of war because such a state means, "worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death" [5]. If men tend to avoid war, it follows that the state does as well. There are exceptions to this claim, of course, but it seems to be true that most states prefer not to engage in war when it is avoidable. Deterrence is an effective tactic when states avoid war.
Deterrence ceases to be an effective tactic, and Hobbesian logic an adequate explanation for events, when actors outside of the state system gain significant influence—and when those actors do not adhere to Hobbes' assumption that violent death is the worst evil to be avoided. A terrorist group like the Islamic State, for example, is effective precisely because its members do not treat violent death as something to be feared.
Perhaps today's most prominent example of the breakdown in Hobbesian logic is the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict. From a deterrence perspective, one might expect that the difference in military power between Israel and Palestine would be sufficient to deter any Palestinian aggression, and thus, that conflict between the two would cease. Yet factions within Palestine consistently display the intent (if not the capacity) to harm Israel's security; this in turn gives Israel justification for maintaining an outsized military capable of quashing, if not deterring, its enemies. Why does deterrence not work in this case, as the Hobbesian logic of relative power dictates it should?
One reason may be that for various reasons, there is not a real Palestinian state/government acting as the people's sovereign. The Palestinians are divided politically, and decision-making power is similarly split. As a result, Palestine is not behaving as a state, and does not display the characteristics of one under Hobbesian logic.
Another explanation is that from a Palestinian perspective, the status quo, though technically "peaceful," is so intolerable that it parallels the effect of war. Many people are so strongly motivated to change their situation that they are willing to risk retaliation and war. There can be no true sovereign right now because that sovereign, whether it be a monarch, a ruling class or a democratic body, would be incapable of protecting its people.
There are other explanations for why this particular situation displays elements that appear to operate outside of the system Hobbes constructs in Leviathan. The point, however, is that anomalies of behavior do occur, and that the logic Hobbes employs when building up to his Commonwealths, though generally sound, does not cover all possible situations. Hobbes remains a useful framework for thinking about the international system, but the explanatory power of his particular logic is finite.
[1] Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter XVII, New York, NY: W.W. Norton& Company, 1996.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Hobbes, Chapter XIII.
In modern-day terms, we can see these "kingdoms" as countries, arguably the largest units that behave with individual sovereignty in the international system. What is true of one man should hold true for a country; it acts in its own best interest, to strengthen itself and weaken its enemies. Hobbes explains that strength is relative, not absolute. A country attains security when "the odds of the enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment to determine the event of war, as to move him to attempt" [4]. In other words, a country is strong enough when its enemies are deterred by its strength from attacking it. Any strength less than that is worthless from a security perspective.
History shows that many countries, particularly relatively powerful ones, accept Hobbes' logic and act accordingly. The Cold War centered around a nuclear arms race between two major powers, the United States and the USSR. The two enemies competed for security in the form of a large enough power differential to deter attack and establish one country as the dominant power. Speaking in more general terms, it is fair to say that in countries which have no expansionist aspirations, militaries exist because other militaries exist.
In a world in which states are the primary actors on the world stage, Hobbesian logic regarding relative power holds. Underlying this logic is an assumption that Hobbes makes in Part 1 of Leviathan, that men are motivated to avoid living in a state of war because such a state means, "worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death" [5]. If men tend to avoid war, it follows that the state does as well. There are exceptions to this claim, of course, but it seems to be true that most states prefer not to engage in war when it is avoidable. Deterrence is an effective tactic when states avoid war.
Deterrence ceases to be an effective tactic, and Hobbesian logic an adequate explanation for events, when actors outside of the state system gain significant influence—and when those actors do not adhere to Hobbes' assumption that violent death is the worst evil to be avoided. A terrorist group like the Islamic State, for example, is effective precisely because its members do not treat violent death as something to be feared.
Perhaps today's most prominent example of the breakdown in Hobbesian logic is the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict. From a deterrence perspective, one might expect that the difference in military power between Israel and Palestine would be sufficient to deter any Palestinian aggression, and thus, that conflict between the two would cease. Yet factions within Palestine consistently display the intent (if not the capacity) to harm Israel's security; this in turn gives Israel justification for maintaining an outsized military capable of quashing, if not deterring, its enemies. Why does deterrence not work in this case, as the Hobbesian logic of relative power dictates it should?
One reason may be that for various reasons, there is not a real Palestinian state/government acting as the people's sovereign. The Palestinians are divided politically, and decision-making power is similarly split. As a result, Palestine is not behaving as a state, and does not display the characteristics of one under Hobbesian logic.
Another explanation is that from a Palestinian perspective, the status quo, though technically "peaceful," is so intolerable that it parallels the effect of war. Many people are so strongly motivated to change their situation that they are willing to risk retaliation and war. There can be no true sovereign right now because that sovereign, whether it be a monarch, a ruling class or a democratic body, would be incapable of protecting its people.
There are other explanations for why this particular situation displays elements that appear to operate outside of the system Hobbes constructs in Leviathan. The point, however, is that anomalies of behavior do occur, and that the logic Hobbes employs when building up to his Commonwealths, though generally sound, does not cover all possible situations. Hobbes remains a useful framework for thinking about the international system, but the explanatory power of his particular logic is finite.
[1] Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter XVII, New York, NY: W.W. Norton& Company, 1996.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Hobbes, Chapter XIII.
This was really interesting, Hannah. And I think it highlights what was discussed briefly in our lecture - that not all players within the realm of international relations are states. And, therefore, they will not behave as states. Furthermore, this idea of rational best interest is unique to each self. While Palestine at times may seem to behave irrationally in the way that it engages with a much stronger military force, from the Palestinian perspective, it may seem that the only rational course of action is to continue the conflict to avoid the conditions that are "intolerable," as you put it. Thanks for posting.
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