Escaping Coercion: Conflict, Dialogue and International Organizations

“Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.”

-          John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961

United Nations Negotiations (Photo Credit: New York Times)

Thomas Hobbes wrote in Leviathan, his seminal philosophical primer on government, that “if there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men. And in all places, where men have lived by small Families, to robbe and spoyle one another…”[1] Some international relations theorists postulate that rational bargaining can replace the Hobbesian need for a coercive force to govern actors and tame the anarchy within the international realm.

One important venue for bargaining between disputing states is international organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, or the United Nations. The purpose of this post is to discuss the role that collective bargaining facilitated by international organizations has played in preventing coercive force between states. This analysis will allow us to reflect on the validity of Hobbes and realism within the context of historical conflicts in the international system.

Liberalism and Realism: Different views of the same glass

The two prevailing views on the role of international organizations in the international realm are realism, espoused by thinkers like Hobbes, and liberal institution theory, which credits much of its philosophy to Immanuel Kant.[2] Both theories agree that in the absence of a sovereign authority, states can freely exercise force to achieve their individual interests.[3] Liberal institution theory contends that institutions dissuade states from using coercive force by facilitating conflict resolution and reducing the occurrence of disputes.[4] Realists conclude pessimistically that these organizations only serve to reflect the existing political climate, rather than changing relations between states.[5] Robert Jervis summarized the predominant difference between these theories, arguing that “neoliberalism believes that there is much more unrealized or potential cooperation than does realism, and the schools of thought disagree about how much conflict in world politics is unnecessary or avoidable.”[6]

Avoiding Conflict: Case Studies from the 20^th Century

An exhaustive review of the historical success of international institutions in conflict resolution is neither practical nor appropriate, but lessons can be gleaned from a cursory discussion of these events.

Diplomatic Success: The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)

The Cold War reached a climax in October 1962, when the USSR responded to the U.S. deployment of Jupiter nuclear ballistic missiles in Italy and Turkey by sending Russian nuclear missiles to Cuba.[7] John F. Kennedy escalated the conflict by blockading Cuba, creating a standoff between the U.S. and the USSR and placing the world on the brink of nuclear war.[8]

U.S. Jupiter Missile Emplacement EU (Photo Credit: Wikipedia)

Missile Intelligence Photos at the UN (Photo Credit: Wikipedia)

The United Nations became the forum for belligerent negotiations between the parties, represented by U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Adlai Stevenson, and Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Zorin.[9] The Secretary General of the United Nations during this critical moment was a Burmese diplomat named U Thant. Dorn and Pauk write that:

“In the deepening crisis, the United Nations, and specifically Secretary General Thant, was to play a significant role in de-escalating and then resolving the nuclear standoff, between the superpowers. Thant sent appeals and messages, relayed proposals, offered reassurances, advanced the “noninvasion for missiles” formula that formed the basis of the final agreement, shuttled to Cuba to mollify Castro, and helped secure a verification arrangement.”[10]

The United Nations and Thant played a crucial role in helping the belligerent parties reach an agreement, preventing nuclear war. Kennedy concluded after the event that “U Thant has put the world deeply in his debt.”[11] The United Nations role in the Cuban Missile Crisis was significant because it demonstrated that international organizations could facilitate rational bargaining between states in conflict.

Diplomatic Failure: The Kosovo War (1998)

The Kosovo War was a conflict that between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1998. The conflict was instigated when Slobodan Milošević revoked Kosovo’s political autonomy and pursued an apartheid agenda.[12] The KLA trafficked weapons from Albania and launched a campaign of attacks against Serbian law enforcement and government institutions.[13] Serbian military and irregular forces responded by launching a retributive campaign, resulting in hundreds of civilian deaths and displacing over 800,000 people.[14]

The United Nations initially sought to address the conflict diplomatically, but “multiple and divergent agendas and expectations and mixed signals from the international community impeded effective diplomacy.”[15] The United Nations negotiators sought to use coercion and threats to compel Milosevic to end the conflict, but the threats were not back with credible force.[16] The United Nations consensus building was hampered by a Russian- led coalition, which voiced a “rigid commitment to veto any enforcement action.”[17] Without the credible threat of force, convincing both parties to accept a diplomatic solution was impossible. NATO ultimately entered Kosovo without a UN mandate, using coercive force to restore order.

Conclusions

Realists would look at the Cuban Missile Crisis and conclude that the UN negotiations were successful because both sides were desperate to avoid a nuclear war. Realists would contend that mutually assured destruction compelled the US and the USSR to negotiate, and that the United Nations diplomacy simply reflected these political realities. Proponents of liberal institution theory might reasonably counter that military advisors on both sides urgently advocated a first strike, and that UN diplomatic intervention prevented war by facilitating rational dialogue.

Consensus building remains an essential part of dialogue and conflict resolution for international organizations. Perhaps the Kosovo War really echoes the realist Hobbesian lesson that “covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.”[18] The United Nations Security Council is responsible for addressing conflicts and leading the international response, but often cannot compel states to seek a diplomatic solution to intractable disputes without the threat of coercive force. The UN Security Council has significant power to deter aggressors and negotiate diplomatic solutions to disputes, but is hampered by rules which provide strong nations with a veto. Fundamental philosophical differences between the great powers on conflicts such as Rwanda, Kosovo, Darfur, Iraq, Libya, and Syria contribute to these diplomatic failures.

Theodore Roosevelt summed up this situation, contending that “no man in public position can, under penalty of forfeiting the right to the respect of those whose regard he most values, fail as the opportunity comes to do all that in him lies for peace.”[19] The international community must commit to reach diplomatic solutions through rational dialogue, addressing future conflicts with a unified voice, grounded in international law and human rights.

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[1] Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996., 79

[2] Boehmer, Charles, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom. "Do intergovernmental organizations promote peace?." World Politics 57, no. 01 (2004): 1

[3] Jervis, Robert. "Realism, neoliberalism, and cooperation: understanding the debate." International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 2

[4] Boehmer, Charles, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom. "Do intergovernmental organizations promote peace?." World Politics 57, no. 01 (2004): 1

[5] Ibid., 1

[6] Jervis, Robert. "Realism, neoliberalism, and cooperation: understanding the debate." International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 6

[7] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_missile_crisis

[8] Dorn, A. Walter, and Robert Pauk. "Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis." Diplomatic History 33, no. 2 (2009): 1.

[9] Ibid., 1

[10] Dorn, A. Walter, and Robert Pauk. "Unsung Mediator: U Thant and the Cuban Missile Crisis." Diplomatic History 33, no. 2 (2009): 2

[11] Dorn, A. Walter, and Robert Pauk. "The closest brush: How a UN secretary-general averted doomsday." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68, no. 6 (2012): 79

[12] Independent International Commission on Kosovo. The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned. Oxford University Press, 2000, 1

[13] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo_War

[14] Spiegel, Paul B., and Peter Salama. "War and mortality in Kosovo, 1998–99: an epidemiological testimony." The Lancet 355, no. 9222 (2000): 2204-2209.

[15] Independent International Commission on Kosovo. The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned. Oxford University Press, 2000, 2

[16] Ibid., 2

[17] Ibid., 2

[18] Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1996.,

[19] Alfred Henry Lewis, A Compilation of the Messages and Speeches of Theodore Roosevelt, Volume 1, B ureau of National Literature and Art, 1906, p. 635