The Leviathan as it relates to National and International Order
The Leviathan is a well-reasoned argument that peace and unity among men is best preserved by establishing commonwealths based on the principle of a social contract. To arrive at this conclusion, Thomas Hobbes begins by discussing the nature of man and then tying those natural principles to the evolution of social systems for ensuring peace and order.
The Leviathan is a well-reasoned argument that peace and unity among men is best preserved by establishing commonwealths based on the principle of a social contract. To arrive at this conclusion, Thomas Hobbes begins by discussing the nature of man and then tying those natural principles to the evolution of social systems for ensuring peace and order.
The Human Condition
The human condition is the subject of the first part of
Leviathan. Leviathan’s initial chapters discuss the idea that biological senses
come from external forces and stimuli.[1] The
pressures, lights, and energies that the environment imposes on our bodies are
sensed and processed by the brain. Our ideas of imagination and memory are decaying,
latent senses which remain after these external stimuli have ceased.[2]
The accumulation of these imaginations and memories is called experience.
Experience and memory become the building blocks for human thought and
reasoning.[3] Hobbes
then evaluates the products of this system, including bodily motion, emotion, and
knowledge.
Human Desire and War
The elements of the human condition such as motion,
knowledge, and emotion come together to form the fundamental human desire, what
Hobbes calls the “general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless
desire of power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death.”[4] As
Fyodor Dostoevsky wrote in Crime and Punishment, “freedom and power, and above
all, power! Over all trembling creation and all the ant-heap!… That’s the goal,
remember that!”[5] ““Power
is only vouchsafed to the man who dares to stoop and pick it up. There is only
one thing, one thing needful: one has only to dare!”[6] Balancing
the human thirst for power is the fear of pain, mutilation, and
destruction.
Desire for resources leads men to seize power, competing as
enemies, resulting in a state of fear. Hobbes rationalizes that “if one plant,
sow build or possesse….others may probably be expected… to dispossesse and
deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also his life, or
liberty.”[7] The state of fear that characterizes the
relationship between individuals in war results in “continuall feare, and
danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish,
and short.”[8]
John Locke came to similar conclusions when evaluating the
state of war that exists outside social constructs, explaining that “he who
would get me into his power without my consent, would use me as he pleased when
he had got me there, and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it; for no body
can desire to have me in his absolute power, unless it be to compel me by force
to that which is against the right of my freedom, i.e. make me a slave. To be
free from such force is the only security of my preservation.”[9]
Developing Social
Systems
Hobbes views the fundamental social organization problem as
a need to develop societies which can check the human desire for power and
preserve individual rights. This society is predicated on Hobbesian laws of
nature. The first three laws of nature are paraphrased below:
- All men should seek peace, and be willing to use force to preserve freedoms and peace.[10]
- Allow others the freedoms and rights you would want them to give you.[11]
- . Men must keep their social contracts, and justice depends on a coercive power to enforce those obligations.[12]
From these ideas, Hobbes derives 16 subsequent laws,
outlining other principles, including how to fairly divide resources, punish
those who violate the social contract, and mediate disputes. The objective of
entering into a social construct predicated on these laws is to escape the
state of misery and war.
The principles which form the framework for this system are
generally supported by other political theorists like John Locke. Locke wrote
in his Second Treatise of Government that
“The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one:
and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it,
that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life,
health, liberty, or possessions.”[13]
These heuristics form the basis for developing social systems to ensure
individual rights.
Commonwealths
The preservation of the social contract is only as strong as
the will and power to enforce its precepts. Hobbes contends that in order to
escape the state of war and establish effective social contracts, the members
of the society must establish a strong, coercive power within the contract to
enforce justice and define the public good.[14] This
power can only be created by conditionally assigning one person or one body of
people to act with the will and authority of all the members of society. The
commonwealth has the power to act with one mind and the authority of all its
members as necessary for peace and common defense. [15]
As Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote in The
Social Contract, “as men cannot engender new forces, but only unite and
direct existing ones, they have no other means of preserving themselves than
the formation, by aggregation, of a sum of forces great enough to overcome the
resistance. These they have to bring into play by means of a single motive
power, and cause to act in concert.”[16]
Three Leviathans
The coercive power required to uphold the social contract,
establish the common good, and provide for common defense can take multiple
forms: one person (monarchy), a group of people or representatives
(aristocracy), or an assembly of all parties to the social contract
(democracy).[17]
Each of the three leviathans wields the total power of the society as a single will.
Hobbes unabashedly favors government by monarchy, arguing
that:[18]
- The monarch’s success is tied directly to the success of his people, where in a democracy or aristocracy, individual leaders may profit at the expense of the society as a whole.
- Monarchs can seek special counsel and study issues in secret, whereas democracies and aristocracies are hampered by their multitudes.
- Governing by aristocracy or democracy yields the potential for laws to vacillate based on the changing whims or attendance records of individual members of the legislating body.
- A monarch cannot disagree with himself out of spite or envy, or start a civil war.
- The danger of favoritism shown be numerous representatives individually is worse than favoritisms that might be shown by a single monarch.
Initial Conclusions
Perusing Hobbes’ Leviathan within the context of
geopolitical history and ideas from similar authors such as John Locke and
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, I reached several preliminary conclusions:
Hobbes warning of the dangers of undue favoritism in aristocratic governments is not unfounded. In the United States, legislators’ favoritism to home states, friendly corporations, and pet projects often unduly influences legislation and spending. Over 10,000 special Congressional spending earmarks in 2007 resulted in spending of nearly $20 billion.[19] Hobbes also correctly points out that monarchies are not subject to the same degree of divisiveness and envy which characterizes relations between lawmakers in legislative bodies of an aristocracy.
The need for a coercive force to uphold the law and enforce social contracts has not diminished with time, technological development, or globalization. Power vacuums in the past three decades in Colombia, Mexico, Pakistan, Somalia, Rwanda, and Nigeria (among many others) have contributed to war and the violation of individual rights. International organizations such as the United Nations often lack the strength to provide a coercive force in the absence of effective local institutions. Creating social contracts and empowering a government with coercive force provides a blueprint for establishing peace within a society of homogenous values. But can we apply these same principles to create peace between intermingled societies with different social contracts and values, especially in historic conflict regions?
Finally, how can we transition from ordered individual societies establish with social contracts, to the international realm? How should sovereign and non-sovereign actors living in a state of anarchy with no higher temporal authority reach agreements and resolve differences? One might contend that the body of international law/treaties/accords, although voluntarily and often non-binding, form a sort of social contract which precludes those who follow from being subject to coercive force in the form of sanctions or military intervention. Examples of this informal social contract could include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreements or Free Trade Agreements.
Hobbes warning of the dangers of undue favoritism in aristocratic governments is not unfounded. In the United States, legislators’ favoritism to home states, friendly corporations, and pet projects often unduly influences legislation and spending. Over 10,000 special Congressional spending earmarks in 2007 resulted in spending of nearly $20 billion.[19] Hobbes also correctly points out that monarchies are not subject to the same degree of divisiveness and envy which characterizes relations between lawmakers in legislative bodies of an aristocracy.
The need for a coercive force to uphold the law and enforce social contracts has not diminished with time, technological development, or globalization. Power vacuums in the past three decades in Colombia, Mexico, Pakistan, Somalia, Rwanda, and Nigeria (among many others) have contributed to war and the violation of individual rights. International organizations such as the United Nations often lack the strength to provide a coercive force in the absence of effective local institutions. Creating social contracts and empowering a government with coercive force provides a blueprint for establishing peace within a society of homogenous values. But can we apply these same principles to create peace between intermingled societies with different social contracts and values, especially in historic conflict regions?
Finally, how can we transition from ordered individual societies establish with social contracts, to the international realm? How should sovereign and non-sovereign actors living in a state of anarchy with no higher temporal authority reach agreements and resolve differences? One might contend that the body of international law/treaties/accords, although voluntarily and often non-binding, form a sort of social contract which precludes those who follow from being subject to coercive force in the form of sanctions or military intervention. Examples of this informal social contract could include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreements or Free Trade Agreements.
[1] Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, New York, NY: W.W. Norton
& Company, 1996., 1
[2] Ibid., 2
[3] Ibid., 2
[4] Ibid., 42
[5] Fyodor
Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, Waxkeep Publishing, 2012., 244
[6] Fyodor
Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, Waxkeep Publishing, 2012., 304
[7] Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, New York, NY: W.W. Norton
& Company, 1996., 55
[9] John
Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Waxkeep Publishing, 2011, 9
[11] Ibid.,
59
[12] Ibid.,
66-68
[13] John
Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Waxkeep Publishing, 2011, 4
[15] Ibid.,
81
[16]
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, Waxkeep Publishing , 2013, 8
[18] Ibid.,
90
[19] Ron
Nixon, “Pork Barrel Remains Hidden in U.S. Budget,” The New York Times, 7 April
2008, accessed 4 January 2015 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/07/washington/07earmarks.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
Ben, this is a great analysis of the text. I would agree that international treaties and agreements, despite being non-binding, provide an excellent platform for resolving and addressing global issues without the presence of a supreme power to coerce world actors. This echoes Hobbes' metaphor of states being like men; the existence of contractual obligation provides incentive for compliance.
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