American foreign policy continues to struggle with the issues surrounding the debate over U.S. entry into the League of Nations in 1918; collective security versus national sovereignty, idealism versus pragmatism, the responsibilities of powerful nations, the use of force to accomplish idealistic goals, the idea of America. Understanding the debate over the League and the consequences of its ultimate failure provides insight into international affairs in the years since the end of the Great War and into collective action problems that the U.S. faces today.
The League of Nations was championed by President Woodrow Wilson in a fourteen-point speech to a joint session of Congress on January 8, 1918, and formally began its operations in January 1920. Ironically, the League failed to win Senate approval and is still remembered as a major example of a communications breakdown between the president and the Senate today.
The major actors involved in this drama were Wilson, the Democratic president, who was stubborn and unwilling to compromise, and Henry Cabot Lodge, the senior senator from Massachusetts for twenty-five years. In 1916, when Wilson had been reelected president, the United States had stayed out of the European war, and Democrats won both houses of Congress. But in 1917, the combination of increasing U-boat attacks, Wilson's request for a declaration of war, and the approaching midterm elections in the fall of 1918, prompted unease in the country. Wilson issued an open letter in late October 1918 to his "fellow countrymen" urging that Democrats retain their majorities in both chambers and suggesting that a Republican victory would give comfort to the Germans.
The letter infuriated Republicans, who indeed had backed the war, and in the 1918 midterm elections the Republicans won control of both the House and the Senate. This allowed Lodge to become majority leader and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He offered a string of reservations to the League's charter, which Wilson refused to accept or even compromise on. Wilson asked Democrats to vote against the package, thinking he could change minds later. But Wilson suffered a crippling stroke in 1919 that incapacitated him for the remainder of his term. Republican Warren Harding replaced him as president in 1920, pledging opposition to the League and forecasting its failure in the United States.
The major actors involved in this drama were Wilson, the Democratic president, who was stubborn and unwilling to compromise, and Henry Cabot Lodge, the senior senator from Massachusetts for twenty-five years. In 1916, when Wilson had been reelected president, the United States had stayed out of the European war, and Democrats won both houses of Congress. But in 1917, the combination of increasing U-boat attacks, Wilson's request for a declaration of war, and the approaching midterm elections in the fall of 1918, prompted unease in the country. Wilson issued an open letter in late October 1918 to his "fellow countrymen" urging that Democrats retain their majorities in both chambers and suggesting that a Republican victory would give comfort to the Germans.
The letter infuriated Republicans, who indeed had backed the war, and in the 1918 midterm elections the Republicans won control of both the House and the Senate. This allowed Lodge to become majority leader and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He offered a string of reservations to the League's charter, which Wilson refused to accept or even compromise on. Wilson asked Democrats to vote against the package, thinking he could change minds later. But Wilson suffered a crippling stroke in 1919 that incapacitated him for the remainder of his term. Republican Warren Harding replaced him as president in 1920, pledging opposition to the League and forecasting its failure in the United States.
Hobbesian perspective might argue that such a failure to compromise is one of flaws of democracy. He would probably argue that monarchies do not have the collective action impediments that democratic states endure.
The League of Nations: Wilson's League for Peace (2010 Documentary) http://youtu.be/r0ldr18Rnho
Boehmer, Charles, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom. "Do intergovernmental organizations promote peace?." World Politics 57, no. 01 (2004): 1
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, New York, NY: W.W. Norton& Company, 1996.
Thank you for posting this. It is always interesting to see how internal state politics can have such large global ramifications. I often wonder if the US had been part of the League how long it would have lasted. This idea of statehood and sovereignty vs. cooperation is something that states have wrestled with since Wilson. As we see more states, especially those in the EU, willing to give up larger chunks of their own individualism, I can see the reaction in our Congress happening again. There is a push for increased statehood, a fear of a global government, and a rejection of European models of public policy - such as state-sponsored healthcare. Either way, it is interesting to see how one political sphere and its current tone can bleed into the global consciousness, and vice versa.
ReplyDeleteFatima~I learned a lot reading your post. As Chelsey suggests in her comment, there may be a shift taking place in US-European relations as European states have seen the benefits to linking economically what is already connected geographically. Given the size and position of the US, it seems unlikely that we will find ourselves in a similar situation. This gives rise to the question, to what extent does circumstance shape ideology and vice versa? The US remains highly autonomous and individualistic (compared to European states) because it can, at the moment, afford to be.
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