Wednesday, January 14, 2015

The Relevance of Hobbes on the International Stage

This poll on Monday night was a topic on which our class remained very divided.  This is perhaps such a clouded issue because of all of the international organizations and the level of diplomatic cooperation that we have reached since the end of WWII.  However, one need only look at the interactions of the member states to see the underlying anarchy and mistrust that Hobbes described.  To demonstrate this fact, three international organizations can be explored: the failed League of Nations, the Security Council of the United Nations, and the International Court of Justice.

With the League of Nations, the failings are well-documented.  Ian Hurd discusses global governance in his article "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," and describes Hobbes's argument with regards to international organizations.  "[T]he system is best seen as an example of a society based on coercion rather than consent, or even religious conviction, since (1) the motivation for joining is the fear of certain depredation in the state of nature, (2) the motivation for obeying the sovereign is sanction, and, (3) the obligation to obey exists only while the sovereign maintains almost absolute power."[1]  The reason the League of Nations failed is precisely because there was no coercion.  There was little to no sanction power of the group and the League held nothing close to absolute power.  While Hobbes's view on absolute power might be a bit severe, and, therefore, incomplete, one can certainly see that an authority with no power will be seen as illegitimate and will ultimately fail.  With the Assembly having an equal vote for all members, and each vote requiring unanimity, it was no surprise that this experiment in global governance lasted only briefly.  Every state had the ability to veto any resolution that it found unacceptable, which, in effect, gave each state greater authority than the League itself.  Just as Hobbes predicted, as the lack of coercion became apparent, the legitimacy weakened.

The Security Council of the United Nations can be viewed just as Hobbes described man in the natural state.  "Persons of sovereign authority, because of their independence, are in continual jealousy, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another, that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms." [2] In Five to Rule Them All [3], David Bosco describes the formation of the security council.  The mistrust between the Western Powers, particularly the United States, and the Soviet Union, were a constant roadblock in the Council's formation.  Just as was seen in the League of Nations' Assembly, a veto for all members was implemented for the five permanent members.  Moreover, the formation of the Council itself showed the desire of the victors of WWII to maintain the power that they has just won.  It was a consolidation of the power balance establish by the Allies.  Just as Hobbes described, the weapons remained pointed outward.  The Security Council uses coercion and the threat of combined military might, that had just been displayed to the world immediately prior to its formation, as its main weapon.  In any case, those with the current power on the global stage, were not willing to give it away as part of a collective group motivated by trust and mutual benefit, but rather they established a collective with limited cooperation and clear winners.

Lastly, is the International Court of Justice.  As Eric Posner discusses in "The Decline of the International Court of Justice,"[4] compulsory jurisdiction is something that is optional for UN members.  In fact, the UK is now the only member of the Security Council to allow for it.  In addition, the number of treaties that are written bi-laterally and multi-laterally that specifically allow for ICJ jurisdiction has continued to decline. [5]  States prefer to resolve disagreements between themselves.  The major economic powers of the world have continued to rely on the ICJ less and less.  Four of the ten of the world's leading economies' states have never brought a case before the ICJ. [6]  The large economies of the world would rather use their economic might and influence to resolve international issues and would prefer to not allow compulsory jurisdiction in cases brought against them by smaller states, as is almost always the case.  The ICJ, like the League of Nations, while designed to be a source of resolution on the international stage, is instead becoming less and less useful because of its lack of authority.  There is no enforcement arm of the court and instead it relies on the control granted to it by the members.  As Hobbes describes, this lack of power allows for anarchy, with each states proving their autonomy as they allow for less and less interference from ICJ.

1. Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,"International Organization Volume 53, no. 2 (1999): 384.
2. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (New York: Norton, 1997), 75.
3. David Bosco, Five to Rule Them All, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
4. Eric Posner, "The Decline of the International Court of Justice," Chicago: Chicago School of Law, no. 233 (2004).
5. Eric Posner, "The Decline of the International Court of Justice," Chicago: Chicago School of Law, no. 233 (2004).

4 comments:

  1. I agree with your characterization that relations between states in the international realm are characterized by mistrust, ambition, and coercion, with each state seeking to maximize its security, power, and stability at the expense of other states. Within this context, the UNSC often demonstrates these interactions, and states like Russia and China veto many efforts which might expand western influence and reach in conflict regions. Despite the weaknesses posed by anarchy in the international system, institutions have often successfully limited the scope and duration of conflicts, and helped establish normative behaviors between states, mitigating some of the worst effects of Hobbes's state of nature.

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  2. I certainly agree that Hobbes's view is extreme, like that of many realists. The continued existence of international cooperation, especially through established organizations, seems to refute their arguments. However, the ways that these organizations succeed or fail seems to always lie on their level of authority and ability to coerce. So perhaps their train of thought is correct - there is no cooperation simply for the sake of peace, but rather only out of fear of one's neighbor. The argument of how much these institutions limit or prevent conflicts is such a hard one to make. I personally believe that they do have a huge impact and have drastically reduced large-scale conflict, yet that is almost impossible to prove. The other, more Hobbesian side of the coin, is certainly easier to demonstrate. Thanks for commenting.

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  3. Hi Chelsey - this was a fascinating post; you did a great job of applying Hobbesian theory to a variety of different international organizations. With regard to the Security Council, I wonder if a slightly different argument could be made. It is true that the permanent members were unwilling to completely give up their autonomy, hence the veto. However, I think we could see the very formation of the Security Council as a move away from raw coercion/struggle for power towards an effort at rational agreement. In Five to Rule Them All, Bosco discusses the possibility that the United Nations, specifically the Security Council, has served the purpose of preventing war from breaking out among the most powerful states. Although certainly, strong elements of coercion remain present in the current arrangement, I would consider that the formation of the UN Security Council was a step away from anarchy and towards rationality, if only because each member state recognized the necessity of preventing future war.

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  4. Great blog. Sadly, the more I study this stuff the less and less I become optimistic that rational bargaining will ever become the norm in the IA arena (at least where compliance is a must). In responding to that thought, I think it was Professor Moloney who asked on the last day of class, "So where do we go from here?"

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