In their study of the impact of the international economy on policy preferences within states, Frieden and Rogowski focus primarily on interests, that is, what actors are likely to prefer to do given their interests in particular situations. The authors acknowledge that “these preferences…go on to be mediated by existing political coalitions and institutions,” (47) which leads me to ask the question: how do institutions function in this capacity?
There is extensive scholarly debate over the origin and function of institutions. Are institutions “’congealed tastes’…intentionally created to guarantee the pursuit of particular policies”? Are they a way of gathering together interests to simplify calculations for action? Are they more autonomous actors than either of those definitions implies? (Frieden and Rogowski, 27)
Our understanding of the nature of institutions informs the role we assign to them as mediators of broader political/economic/social preferences. Rather than dwelling on the philosophical, though, let’s look at a concrete example to see if we can understand the role an institution is playing—and thus perhaps glean more knowledge about its nature.
The World Bank is an international economic institution. The WB was created as the International Bank for Reconstruction in 1944, intended to help countries rebuilt after World War II. While the “official goal” of the WB is the reduction of poverty around the world, the Articles of Agreement state that all the Bank’s decision must be guided by a “commitment to the promotion of foreign investment and international trade…and to the facilitation of capital investment.”
Let’s be clear: the World Bank is not a charity organization. If WB members had little to gain from membership, they would not be as invested as they are in the Bank. Rather, by contributing to the expansion of the global economy, member countries might hope to eventually reap the benefits of that expansion.
The World Bank is an instrument that serves the interests of many players on the world stage. Its birth out of the former IBRD shows that states saw utility in continuing to participating in an international economic institution even after its immediate purpose of postwar reconstruction had been accomplished. Though it can be an unwieldy instrument, the Bank retains autonomy and power in its own right.
There is extensive scholarly debate over the origin and function of institutions. Are institutions “’congealed tastes’…intentionally created to guarantee the pursuit of particular policies”? Are they a way of gathering together interests to simplify calculations for action? Are they more autonomous actors than either of those definitions implies? (Frieden and Rogowski, 27)
Our understanding of the nature of institutions informs the role we assign to them as mediators of broader political/economic/social preferences. Rather than dwelling on the philosophical, though, let’s look at a concrete example to see if we can understand the role an institution is playing—and thus perhaps glean more knowledge about its nature.
The World Bank is an international economic institution. The WB was created as the International Bank for Reconstruction in 1944, intended to help countries rebuilt after World War II. While the “official goal” of the WB is the reduction of poverty around the world, the Articles of Agreement state that all the Bank’s decision must be guided by a “commitment to the promotion of foreign investment and international trade…and to the facilitation of capital investment.”
Let’s be clear: the World Bank is not a charity organization. If WB members had little to gain from membership, they would not be as invested as they are in the Bank. Rather, by contributing to the expansion of the global economy, member countries might hope to eventually reap the benefits of that expansion.
The World Bank is an instrument that serves the interests of many players on the world stage. Its birth out of the former IBRD shows that states saw utility in continuing to participating in an international economic institution even after its immediate purpose of postwar reconstruction had been accomplished. Though it can be an unwieldy instrument, the Bank retains autonomy and power in its own right.
Hannah, it seems you are arguing that institutions are congealed tastes- grouping similarly minded states in pursuit of cooperative action, at least in the context of the World Bank. I would argue that international institutions vary significantly, and that the spectrum of those institutions varies from congealed tastes (the OECD) to marriages of convenience (the WTO) to divisive, divergent, and ineffective (the UNSC). This characterization of institutions implies that, within the international realm, such institutions are puppets of the power and consensus of member states. The interesting question that arises from this philosophy, is how does international economic integration affect the development, power, and efficacy of these institutions?
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