The Role of Semantics in Legitimizing the Use of Force

The Syria crisis has challenged the boundaries of international law. The concept of the ‘red line’ was used to justify military intervention in response to the use of chemical weapons. This phenomenon reflects a trend to use law as a strategic asset or instrument of warfare. In the Syrian context, terms and rationales of criminal law (e.g. retribution, deterrence) entered the justification for the use of force. Intervention was framed in a way that suggested that it is acceptable to ‘punish’ the Assad regime through use of force. I argue that the role of semantics reveals certain deeper dilemmas in international law that merit critical reflection.

In international affairs, law is typically presented as neutral and as an objective framework of discourse. The debate on intervention challenges this assumption. Legal terms and concepts were used as strategic tools to portray certain narratives about the conflict and to make use of force more acceptable. Classical philosophy uses the distinction between logos (reasoned discourse), pathos (appeal to sympathies), and ethos (expertise and responsible use of knowledge). The Syria crisis shows that it is important to understand why and how vocabulary and imagery are used to justify certain choices.

Like in previous interventions (e.g. Kosovo, Iraq) specific techniques were used to ‘frame’ the case for action and to make it more persuasive in legal discourse. Action was contrasted with inaction, by way of binary (‘either/or’) dichotomy in which intervention was presented as a lesser of two evils (G20 statement). Pro-intervention speeches used heroic narratives to shift attention from violence of intervener to victims. A compelling example is President Obama’s statement at the General Assembly (‘Should we really accept the notion that the world is powerless in the face of a Rwanda or Srebrenica?’) In legal justifications, emphasis was placed on logic of exceptionalism. The most compelling example is the image of the ‘red line’ itself.  It was invoked to claim the use of ‘chemical weapons’ warrants a repressive response, including a legitimate threat of or recourse to the use of force.

These dynamics illustrate a trend to use legal terms as a strategy in intervention which deserves critical attention in 'interpreting' international law. I would argue that this is a dangerous development. Use of force cannot and should not serve as a short-cut to international justice or as a means of punishment in the ‘criminal sense’.